Foaad Khosmood:
What is your view as to the current
thinking in the US Administration toward
Iran? The rhetoric of Condi Rice (No war
plans right now) is almost exactly what
the administration proclaimed at this
stage of the game with Iraq. Could an
ideologically-driven decision for an
invasion have been made already?
Ahmad Sadri:
The steadily escalating charges of
possession of Weapons of Mass
Destruction is indeed reminiscent of the
prelude to the Iraqi invasion. Is this
all a bluff? Are they playing the good
cop to the bad cop of the Europeans? If
we go with the bluffing theory then they
have not blinked yet and the Iranians
seem to take the treats seriously.
Wishful thinkers proposed this theory
before the Iraqi invasion as well: they
praised Bush for an admirably
poker-faced bluff that forced Iraq to
submit to international inspections. But
the masterful acting turned out to be so
effective because it was not acting at
all. Now, lets consider the alternative
scenario: what if they are not bluffing?
This means that they are fully intent to
follow through with some kind of
military action including selective
bombing and attempts at partial or full
occupation. A bombing will almost
certainly not achieve the goal of
hitting all the nuclear sites and at any
rate it is sure to spur Iran on a more
secretive and effective nuclear weapons
program. An occupation would not be
feasible given the size and the
population of the country and the state
of readiness of its armed forces.
Any operation by ground forces would be
also unthinkable given the enormous cost
and the state of near exhaustion of the
American armed forces in Afghanistan and
Iraq. However, these factors would
exclude American military action against
Iran only if we assume the rationality
of the small counter elite that runs the
foreign policy of the United States. But
what if the thirty or so neo cons who
occupy all the key posts in the US
government have succeeded in liberating
themselves from the concerns of this
puny little world that the rest of us
inhabit?
What if they actually believe that Iraq
is a success story and wish to make more
history like that? Now you see why
answering your question is not so easy:
we are not sure if the American policy
makers operate in the universe of
normal, responsible politics of the
modern world. Ideological politicians
don’t see themselves bound by the
immediate results of their policies.
They expect to be evaluated only on the
merits of their long term objectives,
irrespective of their costs and
consequences. In the short term the
strategy is: damn the torpedoes, full
speed ahead.
FKh:
If a regime change policy is to be acted
on, what form could it take other than
an outright Iraq-style invasion?
AS:
One of my friends calls the Bush-style
regime change occubration: occupation
and liberation. The claim is that the
Americans would first occupy and then
liberate the troublesome countries of
Middle East one by one. Despite the
success of the recent elections in Iraq
(a limited victory achieved at an
enormous price) we perceive the
difficulties yet to be overcome in that
land. Those difficulties will be
multiplied in Iran.
Will the government be a centralized or
a federal one? What political shape
would it take? The gamut runs from a
limited monarchy to a liberal democracy.
What role will ethnic aspirations play
in putting back together the humpty
dumpty? Wouldn’t, for instance an
Iranian Kurdistan wish to unite with its
Iraqi counterpart and what would the
creation of such an entity mean in the
balance of Turkish, Persian and Arab
geopolitics in the region?
The unintended consequences of questions
such as these are not known to anyone
and an external power that would dream
of redrawing the map of the Middle East
is well advised to ponder these
questions.
FKh:
What kind of support is there for
toppling of the Iranian regime amongst
Iranians? Would an invasion be welcome
by the Iranians?
AS:
Tom Friedman wrote in a recent column
that Iran is a so-called Red State. He
had a point. I have found that
criticizing the Bush Administration in
Tehran even in a lecture at the
headquarters of the main opposition
party (Mosharekat) gets a chilly
reception. Such a talk would not be
received in this manner anywhere else in
the world, including most of the lecture
hall I have visited in the United
States. The enemy-of-my-enemy syndrome
is fully in operation in Iran.
People tend to automatically sympathize
with anyone reviled in the state
controlled media. The thinking is that
anything that keeps the ruling right
wing in this new phase of its hegemonic
rule off balance can’t be that bad. But
there is a caveat for President Bush and
his advisors here: public opinion polls
show that this moral sympathy is skin
deep. In the words of Gary Sick in his
February16th congressional briefing: The
Iranian people today are remarkably
pro-American, partly as a negative
reaction to their distaste for their own
government and its anti-American
propaganda. In my view, that would end
with the first bomb.
Iranians may be heard in taxi cabs
saying things like: oh, I wish they
would bomb us if it helps us get rid of
these mullahs. But that is more like
saying: I am sick and tired of this life
which is more of an expression than a
declaration of intent to commit suicide.
In short, despite the apparent
sympathies with an idea of a violent
toppling of the regime in Iran there
will be precious few flowers for
invading liberators. National pride and
the prejudice against the meddling
foreigners are very much alive in Iran.
Instant flocking to whoever happens to
be in control of the central government
(which also happened during the Iraqi
invasion) is the most likely outcome of
military intervention in Iran.
Fkh:
Iran has been called the "most active
state sponsor of international
terrorism." This charge was recently
repeated in the President’s 2005 State
of the Union Address. What is the basis
of this claim by the Administration?
AS:
What we have here is the latest volley
in the American propaganda offensive.
Its cynical authors rely on the
cumulative effect of baseless
accusations that in time have attained a
patina of self-evidence. In the eyes of
the respectable international experts
however -- a company that excludes the
ideological American neo cons and some
Israelis -- it is preposterous to call
Iran the most active state sponsor of
international terrorism.
There have been a lot of accusations but
lets ask: what terrorist activity has
been pinned on Iran? There were no
Iranians involved in the events of 9/11
and no Iranians have been charged in
other incidents that were initially
attributed to Iran: the Khobar towers in
Saudi Arabia, the downing of Pan Am and
TWA airliners and the bombing of the
Jewish Cultural Center in Buenos Aires.
Most recently the 9/11 Commission Report
revealed that some Al-Qaidah members had
crossed Iran without having their
passports stamped. In absence of other
evidence this only means that they must
have crossed Iran illegally. In this
case Iran is less culpable than those
countries (including US) that let the
terrorists through and stamped their
passports.
Of course, until 1997 Iran did engage in
the Argentine-style disappearing and
murder of internal dissidents as well as
extra-territorial assassination of
undesirable expatriates. The last
prominent example of this was the
targeted killings of some Kurdish
nationalists in a restaurant (named
Mykanos) in Germany. But there have been
no further assassinations of this kind
since 1997 partly due to the scandal
that ensued the Mykanos assassinations.
Inside Iran the serial murders of the
dissidents in 1990s may have claimed
more than 80 victims. But no such
murders have been committed in Iran
since President Khatami insisted on
prosecuting those responsible for the
last four of these serial murders.
I can’t say I am happy with the outcome
of those trials but the fact is that
liquidation of the dissidents has
stopped in the past eight years. And,
there has never been any international
terrorist activity involving Iran in the
last two decades.
FKh:
Hezbollah is frequently mentioned in the
US media as a terrorist organization,
backed by Iran, akin to Hamas and
Islamic Jihad. Yet the group enjoys
political legitimacy in Lebanon where it
engages in charity work and takes part
in parliamentary elections. How can we
classify Hezbollah? What is the
objective of Hezbollah military wing in
southern Lebanon?
AS:
There is a fair amount of verbal tribute
to a mythologized Palestinian struggle
against Israel in Iranian state
controlled media. It is far less clear
if the support for the actually existing
Palestinians go beyond slogans. The
relationship with Shiite Hezbollah is
much warmer but again, as you mentioned,
this organization has devolved into a
legitimate political party in Lebanon,
and most of its activities since the
withdrawal of Israel has been in the
area of social welfare.
In short, the Iranian support for
Hezbollah, would hardly make Iran into a
terrorist state. One must also note that
even at the height of its struggle
against the Israeli occupation Hezbollah
never targeted civilians.
FKh:
Are the Iranian hard-line clerics
competing with their Arab counter parts
for support of the Palestinian
population?
AS:
Yes, but not very successfully. We have
to start with the fact that the cultural
connection between Persian Shiites and
the Sunnis of the Levant and Palestine
has always been tenuous. This alienation
has been exacerbated by two decades of
Saudi and Iraqi anti-Shiite propaganda.
On the Iranian side the popular support
for Palestine has been declining.
Iranians rightly sense that the state
cynically uses the issue of Palestine
for domestic purposes. Instead of
gaining sympathy among Palestinians the
Iranian clerics have squandered the
enormous popular support that existed
for the Palestinian cause in
pre-Revolutionary Iran.
FKh:
In a 2003 Daily Star article you wrote:
"Never before have the combination of
regional atomic arsenals and ambitions,
along with a global superpower
aggressive nuclear posture, so
endangered the very existence of the
Middle East." That was before the latest
round (2005) of antagonistic rhetoric
between Iran and USA. How likely is
nuclear detonation now? What
circumstances do you envision could
bring about further nuclear
proliferation?
AS:
The situation remains alarming. There is
a glaring contradiction in the American
stance toward Iran: their coercive
anti-nuclear diplomacy and relentless
bullying of Iran is partly based on
their atomic menace. They are in the
process of refurbishing their atomic
arsenal to produce smaller and tactical
nuclear weapons as well as a new
generation of more robust warheads.
Having extracted every drop of political
use of an atomic arsenal in projecting
their foreign policy the Americans are
not in a position to exhort others
against the nuclear option. Nuclear
disarmament requires an atmosphere of
détente not one of nuclear arm
twisting.
The principle also applies to other
Nuclear Club members in the region. They
can’t saunter about packing nuclear
weapons while issuing unctuous warnings
against the dangers of the nuclear
option for non-members. I am convinced
that nuclear weapons are dangerous for
the Middle East and that is why I urge
an across the board nuclear
de-escalation rather than the regular
NPT regime.
If history proves one thing, it is that
when there is a nuclear will there will
be a nuclear way. Countries like Iran
can use the legal path of developing a
nuclear energy program. At a later date,
when their nuclear expertise reaches the
threshold of other advanced industrial
countries (like Germany and Japan) they
can quickly weaponize. Such an event is
sure to intensify the race for nuclear
weapons in the entire region.
By the way, I am sure that once Iranians
have stocked their own nuclear arsenal
they too will engage in the NPT charade.
They too will come out shedding
crocodile tears and warning others not
to do as they have done but as they say.
The bottom line is that instead of
nuclear realpolitik we need a nuclear
green sentiment among the superpowers,
the regional states and in the
grassroots if we want to reverse the
race to the bottom of a nuclear high
noon in the Middle East.
FKh:
Do you believe Iran is seeking a nuclear
weapon? Why?
AS:
Iran is the world’s most recent victim
of weapons of mass destruction. Masses
of Iranian soldiers were exposed to
Iraq’s chemical weapons. At the time the
Americans not only refused to hold Iraq
responsible for this atrocity; they
actually helped Iraqis to cover up their
crime. Remember that after the gassing
of the Kurds in Halabcheh, Americans
claimed that Iranians might have
perpetrated the crime, thus muddying the
water and allowing Saddam’s regime to
escape international condemnation.
The point is that the American coercive
diplomacy has further intensified the
nationalist flavor of the nuclear debate
in Iran. This means that even a regime
change will not quench the nationalist
thirst for nukes. The situation is so
bad that the best way of making
political hay in Iran is demanding a
withdrawal from NPT and IAEA.
So, the answer to your question is: yes.
There is a nuclear will in Iran not only
as the right wing Mullahs’ buffer
against intervention but also as an
issue of national security. The way to
defuse this problem is not nuclear
intimidation but negotiation among
nuclear and non-nuclear powers in the
region.
FKh:
The 8-year Iran-Iraq war resulted in
almost a million deaths yet it is hardly
ever mentioned by the US media and the
administration these days. What do you
believe was the impact of the Iran-Iraq
war on the region?
AS:
I just spoke of one of the consequences
of that war which is the anxiety of
exposure to weapons of mass destruction.
But the Iran-Iraq war is also
responsible for stoking various fires
that still smolder all over Iran’s
political scene. For instance the
disappointing end of the Iran-Iraq war
was in my view the prime mover of the
reform movement in Iran. Cynical
exploitation of religion and the
extremist slogans (such as fighting a
technological war by relaying on mass
martyrdom etc.) cost Iran hundreds of
thousands of casualties.
When the absolutist do-or-die promises
fizzled in accepting an inconclusive
peace there was a great deal of
disenchantment in the ranks, which in
time percolated up into the political
chambers of Iran generating what came to
be known as the reform movement. In
terms of future relations between the
two nations I believe both learned a
good lesson in futility of military
solutions for their border problems.
FKh:
You have done some research on the
maverick figure of Abdulkarim Soroush
and his philosophy of a democratic
modernist Islam. Do you believe that
people like Soroush are having an impact
on the Iranian clergy?
AS:
I would not call Soroush a maverick
figure. Rather he is the forerunner of
an intellectual reform movement, which
defines the mainstream of public
thinking in Iran. The movement has found
many worthy practitioners, fellow
travelers and followers. But what is
more important than the impact of
Soroush on Iran is the way he represents
the Iranian experience. There is no
dearth of brilliant Muslim reformers in
the Islamic world from Morocco to
Indonesia. But it is only in Iran that
the intellectual reform articulates the
massive disenchantment of the population
with the ideal of the government of God.
It is not an accident that Iran is the
only Muslim country with no grassroots
fundamentalist movement. Of course, the
insights of Abdlokarim Soroush are
revolutionary not only for Iran but also
for the Islamic world. His
groundbreaking work on separating
religion and its human interpretation
was vastly influential in 1990s.
His more recent work on the essential
and accidental aspects of religion
represents another paradigm shifts in
the Islamic intellectual horizon. What
is in a holy book, he maintains, is to a
large extent determined by the accidents
of a prophet’s life. Many verses in the
Quran are the direct result of such
accidents (e.g., the verses relating
adultery.)
Soroush also observes that if the
prophet’s life had been different,
longer or shorter the Quran could have
been of a different length and content.
The lesson is to seek the spirit of the
religion rather than its literal
content. Muslims must listen to the
prophetic voice of the Quran rather than
confine themselves in legalistic form
derived from it.
This insight would also challenge the
literalism of all fundamentalists
regardless of their religious tradition.
For instance there is no example of
Jesus Christ using force to stop an
aggressor against a defenseless victim.
After all, he never happened to stumble
on a scene of a Roman soldier attempting
to rape a Jewish woman. Hence, it is
essential that theologians extrapolate
beyond the text rather than imprisoning
themselves in it.
FKh:
Whatever the Islamic Republic is right
now, is there reason to believe it is
headed in the direction of either
increased repression or increased
freedom and pluralism? What do you think
of the performance of President Khatami
in the struggle of Iranians for these
goals?
AS:
Well, the disheartening defeat of the
political reform movement (as a result
of the intransigence of the right wing
and inept leadership of President
Khatami) must not lead us to despair.
The intellectual reform in Iran is alive
and well indeed. The empowered right
wing has gained its present supremacy in
the parliament by cheating as well as by
default. The illegal vetting of the
candidates by the rightwing Guardian
Council and the indifference of the
Iranian electorate after the failure of
the reform has produced a rightwing
parliament.
That combination may yet bring us a
rightwing president in the coming months
as well. But the paradigm shift of the
intellectual reform in Iran is an
accomplished and irreversible fact. On
that basis alone, one can predict a
bright future for freedom, democracy and
pluralism in Iran. Sadly that future has
got to be of the distant rather than the
immediate kind.
Ahmad Sadri, currently professor and
chair of the Sociology and Anthropology
Department at Lake Forest College was
born in Tehran and obtained his BA and
MA degrees from the University of Tehran
and his PhD from the New School for
Social Research in New York City. He is
the author of Max Weber's Sociology of
Intellectuals (Oxford University Press,
1992, 1994) and "Reviving the Concept of
Civilizations," published by Hermes
Press in 2001 in Persian. He has
translated from Arabic Saddam City
(London, Saqi, 2004) and co-translated
from Persian, Reason, Freedom and
Democracy in Islam (Oxford University
Press, 2002). He is an active
participant in the intellectual reform
movement in Iran and was a columnist for
the English Language "Daily Star" of
Lebanon during 2004. Sadri has written
extensively in the areas of his
expertise, sociologies of intellectuals
and religion.
Foaad Khosmood is the Editor of ZNet's
Iran Watch.
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