{"id":73,"date":"2000-10-01T20:15:29","date_gmt":"2000-10-02T03:15:29","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/doctorsoroush.com\/english\/?p=73"},"modified":"2012-09-20T20:19:23","modified_gmt":"2012-09-21T03:19:23","slug":"truth-reason-salvation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/drsoroush.com\/en\/truth-reason-salvation\/","title":{"rendered":"Truth, Reason, Salvation"},"content":{"rendered":"

In A Soroush, Seratha-yi Mostaqim, (1377\/1998) Tehran: Serat, pp137-196<\/p>\n

Q. Since you put forward the theory of religious pluralism, there\u2019s been much debate
\non the subject and various people have commented on it. But understanding the
\ntheory of pluralism must surely take precedence over criticising and judging it. A
\nbrief look at the debates suggests that this idea hasn\u2019t been well understood yet and,
\nof course, this fact overshadows any criticism. We\u2019ll therefore use this opportunity to
\nprobe the issues involved in order to arrive at a better and more in-depth
\nunderstanding of the theory.
\nIt would seem that the theory of religious pluralism can be examined and
\ndiscussed from three angles. First, in terms of its theoretical foundations. If
\nsomeone doesn\u2019t accept the theoretical foundations, they will clearly not accept the
\ntheory either; theoretical foundations such as our understanding of truth, the
\nessence of religion, rationality, salvation and so on. Some of the questions raised
\nhere will be about these theoretical foundations. And we\u2019ll try, with your assistance,
\nto improve the comprehension of these theoretical foundations.
\nSecondly, some of the objections and questions that have been raised concern
\nthe consequences and results of accepting this theory. If someone accepts the theory
\nof religious pluralism, they have to adjust their current beliefs to bring them into line
\nwith the theory\u2019s implications or arrive at a new understanding of their beliefs. This
\nitself has caused a certain amount of anxiety among some believers, because they
\nfeel they cannot accommodate the implications of this theory within their belief
\nsystem.
\nThe third angle is mainly methodological; that is to say, some people are
\nasking why we have to approach the debate on pluralism from an extra-religious
\nperspective and why we can\u2019t look at it from an intra-religious perspective. There are
\nothers who believe that the reasons you have given to substantiate and support the
\ntheory are insufficient. Hence, our questions will fall under these three categories.
\nMy first question concerns the way we approach the subject of religious
\npluralism. At times, you cite certain verses from the Koran or religious narratives to
\nexplain and support your assertions. The critics, too, base their rejection of this
\npluralism on certain verses from the Koran, religious narratives, and the words and
\ndeeds of our revered religious figures. Should the debate about religious pluralism
\ntake place internally, on the basis of religious sources and texts, or from an extrareligious
\nperspective? And how do justify your choice of perspective? Why do you
\nsuggest on occasion that this debate must be viewed, first and foremost, from an
\nextra-religious perspective and that we must then adjust our intra-religious
\nperceptions to it?<\/strong>
\nA. In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful. I\u2019d like to thank you for
\nopening the discussion and for setting out the issues in such a clear way to help shed more
\nlight on the arguments about religious pluralism. As you said, the theory of religious
\npluralism rests on certain foundations and assumptions. The question of truth, rationality,
\nbeing rightly guided, salvation, the essence of religion and, I\u2019d like to add, the issue of
\n\u00ab nominalism \u00bb are among the underlying assumptions of the theory of pluralism. Of course,
\nnominalism is not one of the decisive and unavoidable prerequisites of pluralism, but it does
\nhave a bearing on and is linked to this issue, and we may touch on this subject later.
\nYou asked about the extra-religious or intra-religious nature of the debate. In fact, I
\nthink you can broach the question of pluralism from either perspective, but the issues that
\nwill arise will differ, as will the scope of the implications. We can ask, what\u2019s Islam\u2019s position
\non pluralism? We can ask about Christianity\u2019s position. In this case, we would have to refer
\nto the teachings internal to these two religions and put our question to these religions\u2019
\nleaders and thinkers. However, if we don\u2019t want to know Islam\u2019s specific viewpoint or
\nChristianity\u2019s specific viewpoint on this issue, then logic would dictate that we pitch the
\nquestion in a purely rational and extra-religious way such that the answer would hold equally
\ntrue for all religions; in which case, we would pose our question in the following terms: given
\nthe actually existing plurality of religions, what theoretical or practical position should we
\nadopt? Theoretically, should we see them as equally valid paths towards salvation or not?
\nAnd, in practice, must we treat all religions and all their followers with equal tolerance and
\nforbearance?
\nHence, the extra-religious perspective raises the question about all religions,
\nregardless of their truth or falsehood, whereas the intra-religious perspective assumes one
\nreligion to be the true religion and asks for its view regarding all other religions. This is the
\nfirst point.
\nThe second point is that understanding intra-religious teachings is (according to the
\ntheory put forward in Contraction and Expansion) basically impossible without referring to
\nextra-religious ideas and truths. If we reach a particular conclusion on pluralism extrareligiously
\nand commit ourselves to it, then our intra-religious perception will per force fall into
\nline with it. At the very least, there will be some interaction between our intra-religious and
\nextra-religious perception. But, if we speak strictly intra-religiously and hold no views about
\nthis extra-religiously, it will mean that our work and our conclusions will remain incomplete.
\nThe point that I\u2019d like to add here is that, in discussing pluralism, we have to
\ndistinguish our own position from that of the prophets. Any prophet and the founder of any
\nreligion only calls on people to follow his religion. In other words, no prophet can be a
\npluralist. A prophet\u2019s entire raison d\u2019\u00eatre is to call on others to follow him and to dissuade
\nthem from adherence to other schools and sects. Any prophet essentially urges people to
\nfollow his religion and incidentally stokes the furnace of pluralism, because he adds another
\nsect to all the previous sects. This is in the nature of prophethood. But when we are not
\nacting as prophets, when we\u2019re simply observing and describing religions, we have no choice
\nbut to begin outside religion and, then, to assess the claims made within a given religion,
\nbecause with pluralism, the intention is to find a theoretical explanation for and a practical
\napproach to the actually existing plurality in the realm of religion. The intention is not to
\nestablish the truth of one religion and the falsehood of all others.
\nAs we said, in the first instance it is prophets themselves who bring about this
\nplurality; it is the unintended consequence of their message. Now it is up to us to make what
\nwe can of this inevitable, unintended consequence. Imagine, for example, that we are
\ndiscussing the truth. It goes without saying that every prophet believes he is propagating the
\ntruth. But heeding a prophet\u2019s message does not lie in our assuming that it is the truth as
\nsoon as we hear it. We must first make it clear in our own minds in a general and extrareligious
\nway what we mean by truth.
\nQ. Does the extra-religious debate take logical precedence over the intrareligious<\/strong>
\ndebate?<\/strong>
\nA. Yes, it takes logical precedence.
\nQ. Why do you say that all prophets have to be exclusivists? It\u2019s rationally<\/strong>
\npossible for us to turn to a religion\u2019s texts and find that a prophet also acknowledged<\/strong>
\nthe truth of other religions. Of course, the prophet\u2019s recognition of other truths may<\/strong>
\nnot be based on a totally pluralistic position, but it\u2019s not imperative for him to be an<\/strong>
\nexclusivist.<\/strong>
\nA. The prophets who have come and gone thus far and with whom we are familiar
\nhave all called on people to turn to their religion. By a process of induction, we can see that
\neach of them accepted other religions to the extent that they were in line with their own
\nreligion. They recognised the truth of other religions and granted them a share in people\u2019s
\nguidance as far as they deemed this possible based on the religions\u2019 common features. And
\nMuslims believe that we have seen the last of the prophets. We cannot, therefore, arrive at
\nany other assumption. Now, if other people come along at some later point in time and
\npresent religion in a different way, we will have to wait and see. At any rate, the story of the
\nprophets thus far is as we have seen.
\nI would like to add a third point to my previous arguments: in order to stress and
\nconfirm the point that the debate about pluralism is an extra-religious debate, we can cite the
\nfact that all the building blocks of pluralism are extra-religious; that is, the question of
\n\u00ab rationality \u00bb, \u00ab salvation \u00bb, \u00ab the essence of religion \u00bb, \u00ab being rightly guided \u00bb, \u00ab the
\ninterpretation of experience \u00bb, \u00ab the interpretation of texts \u00bb and so on are all extra-religious
\nissues. Once pluralism is based on these blocks, it will logically and per force become an
\nextra-religious debate. Of course, as I said, you can ask what a particular religion\u2019s position
\nis on guidance or salvation or rationality. These are all valid questions. But this would no
\nlonger involve questions about rationality in general or guidance in general. Hence, when we
\nspeak about rationality, truth and guidance in a general sense, our discussion will
\nundoubtedly be an extra-religious one.
\nStill, let us assume for a moment that the debate about pluralism is intra-religious.
\nEven so, we would arrive at real pluralism. In other words, adopting this approach wouldn\u2019t
\nsolve the problem, because each religion would have its own verdict on guidance, salvation,
\nrationality, truth and the essence of religion. Hence, the verdicts would be very varied and
\nnumerous, and we would again have arrived at the same point. We would then have to
\nengage in an extra-religious debate about this plurality. The logic of the debate, therefore,
\ndictates that we begin our inquiry from outside. Once we arrive at some definite and firm
\nconclusions, we can then use them to understand intra-religious debates.
\nQ. In other words, every religion is exclusivist on its own terms, but when we<\/strong>
\nlook from outside, we arrive at pluralism?<\/strong>
\nA. Yes. That is to say, every religion wishes to be the only one, but the unintended
\nconsequence of this exclusivism is pluralism. And, at the end of the day, discussing things
\nfrom an intra-religious perspective will not solve anything. It will simply lead us to the same
\npluralism as before by another route.
\nQ. What\u2019s the epistemological basis of the religious pluralism you espouse?<\/strong>
\nIs it rationality and critical realism or relativism? In other words, if in a simplified<\/strong>
\nclassification, we divide epistemological positions into raw realism, critical realism<\/strong>
\nand relativism, it seems as if the thrust of your argument in Contraction and<\/strong>
\nExpansion was to move from raw realism to critical realism. But some of the points<\/strong>
\nraised in the debate on religious pluralism have created the impression that you\u2019ve<\/strong>
\nmoved on even further and are, in effect, advancing a relativist epistemology. In fact,<\/strong>
\nit seems as if we can have two types of pluralism. That is to say, we can arrive at the<\/strong>
\nplurality of truth on the basis of two readings: one is based on critical realism,<\/strong>
\nwhereby we recognise certain limitations in the discovery of the truth and therefore<\/strong>
\nposit different manifestations of truth; the other is based on a relativist position,<\/strong>
\nwhereby we see everything as equally valid and equally true. Hence, pluralism and<\/strong>
\nbelief in plurality can be based on either critical realism or relativism. What\u2019s the<\/strong>
\nbasis of your position on pluralism?<\/strong>
\nA. Let\u2019s not lose sight of the fact that we\u2018re talking about religious pluralism and not
\npluralism per se, which would also embrace philosophy, science and so on.
\nWe\u2019re discussing religious pluralism and religious pluralism has differences with the
\npluralism you\u2019ll find in philosophy. This is a point we have to be careful about, otherwise, it
\ncan lead to fallacious arguments.
\nIn philosophy and science, relativism is a dangerous pitfall. Although it is difficult to
\nspeak about specific instances in this area, it can be said in general and absolute terms that
\nrelativism is not an acceptable position. It is the type of fallacious conclusion that points to
\nsome kind of problem or fallacy earlier on in the premises.
\nSince truth in religion is different from truth in philosophy and science, one has to be
\nextra careful about usage. As you suggested, raw realism is appropriate to a world that is
\nassumed to be simple; complicated realism, to a world that is assumed to be complicated.
\nThe history of rationality in human societies, the insights human beings have gained into
\nrationality, its twists and turns throughout the course of history, the errors it has fallen into,
\nthe impasses it has faced, the antinomies it has generated, the irresolvable disputes that
\nhave arisen over the years, and the discoveries that have been made concerning cause and
\nreason have, all in all, rendered people more sensitive to the reality of rationality, its
\nhistoricality and its capabilities. Perhaps there was a time when people expected more from
\nrationality, but now science, reason and philosophy have become more modest and this
\nmodesty is the outcome of the growth of rationality. This rational modesty will undoubtedly
\nextend its judgement to our understanding of religion.
\nHence, my position is the complicated rationality or critical rationality that you
\nmentioned. That is to say, the real world, be it religion, philosophy or nature, is much too
\ncomplicated to be dealt with by judgements based on simple rationality or to sanction
\ndogmatic commitment to one single option. Collective criticism and openness to criticism are
\nthe main tools that will allow our theories to become more complicated and advanced and
\npossibly allow us to move closer to reality. One of the clear consequences of critical
\nrationality is to show that our certainties are little more than suspicions; not in the sense that
\none can never arrive at reality but in the sense that arriving at reality has no specific
\nsignpost. The signposts mentioned in traditional philosophy such as observation, certitude,
\netc. are all precarious. Hence, one cannot easily distinguish that which is true from that
\nwhich is not true. This is why, although critical rationality accepts the definition of
\n\u00ab veracity \u00bb as a conception that corresponds to reality (which, of course, has rivals),
\nnonetheless, it recognises that giving concrete substance to this definition and finding
\nspecific conceptions that correspond to reality are fraught with difficulties. Critical rationality
\nis, therefore, much more modest in its claims and takes human fallibility very seriously.
\nQ. If there are no signposts indicating that we have arrived at reality, are there<\/strong>
\nalso no signposts indicating that we have moved closer to it?<\/strong>
\nA. No, there aren\u2019t. We have no clear indication of that either. We must investigate
\nceaselessly. In other words, with critical rationality, thinking about, interpreting and
\nunderstanding reality is an interminable process. It is a collective, continuous affair. This in
\nitself gives us cause to be very modest and releases us from the urge to make exaggerated
\nand extreme claims.
\nThis critical rationality applies in every field of human endeavour, including the
\nunderstanding of religion and the acceptance of religion. In other words, being religious and
\nunderstanding religion is a collective, ceaseless, interminable and undogmatic process that
\nis open to criticism and refinement. You cannot by any means derive relativism from all this.
\nWhatever the reality may be (in itself), we are faced with complications and difficulties in
\nterms of its verification (for us).
\nCritical rationality or complicated rationality or taking human fallibility seriously is an
\n\u00ab all or nothing \u00bb project; either it applies everywhere or it doesn\u2019t apply anywhere. We
\ncannot remove part of reality, such as religion, from its jurisdiction. I think that, if we enter
\nthe arena of rationality on this basis, we\u2019ll see that at least one type of pluralism, that is,
\nnegative pluralism, is absolutely unavoidable. That is to say, it naturally demands and
\nestablishes this kind of perspective. In other words, what Kant was saying about our
\nperception of things in our daily lives, in the interpretation of texts or religious experiences, in
\njurisprudence or in the speculative sciences will seem very natural to us. It is in the nature of
\nreason to come up against walls on occasion, in the sense that, on a single issue, collective
\nreason may arrive at several different verdicts and none of these verdicts can drive the
\nothers out of the field. We have seen many examples of this coming up against a wall in
\nphilosophy, in the natural sciences, in theology, in jurisprudence, in ethics and so on. It was
\non the basis of these outcomes generated by reason that we came to understand rationality
\nbetter and to arrive at critical rationality. It is raw realism that refuses to acknowledge that
\nrationality can come up against walls and fails to distinguish between the in itself and the for
\nus. And it is critical rationality that forms the basis of pluralism. If a person believes that
\ntheir mind is a tabula rasa passively reflecting the truth, and that facts are easily and nonproblematically
\nreflected onto it, they will clearly see no point in epistemological pluralism.
\nBut then they have to answer such questions as: why do we arrive at antinomic
\npropositions? Why have different schools of philosophical thought survived over the course
\nof history? Why do we have many instances of irreconcilable verdicts in the fields of ethics,
\nfiqh and law? and so on. We are faced with a choice here and I believe that human
\nexperience has shown that this rationality that comes up against walls is superior to that
\nrationality that recognises no walls.
\nQ. You said that, if we opt for raw realism, then we won\u2019t accept pluralism. Is<\/strong>
\nthis necessarily the case? We may be raw realists and see the mind as a tabula rasa,<\/strong>
\nbut we may believe that reality is multifarious and arrive at pluralism in this way. In<\/strong>
\nother words, must complicated truth and complicated perception always go together.<\/strong>
\nOr could it be that perception may be a tabula rasa while reality is multifarious?<\/strong>
\nA. I was speaking about epistemological pluralism; in other words, different and
\nirreducible conceptions and arguments that have been exhausted. You are referring to a
\nplurality of reality in itself. And, of course, the case you make is reasonable.
\nQ. In the relevant debates and critiques, your view has, on the whole, been<\/strong>
\npresented in such a way as to suggest that your epistemological position, that is,<\/strong>
\ncritical rationality, ultimately amounts to relativism. What, in your own opinion,<\/strong>
\ndistinguishes critical rationality from relativism?<\/strong>
\nA. I believe what led to the appearance of \u00ab relativity \u00bb in modern epistemology was
\nthat cause gained the upper hand over reason; or, to put it more simply, reason was
\nsacrificed at the altar of cause. Relativism has often been defined as the suggestion that
\neverything is relatively true. But it\u2019s best defined in another way and the current trend in
\nepistemology provides us with this new definition. Modern epistemology, which has led to
\nrelativism, begins by weakening the role played by reasons in the realm of knowledge,
\noccasionally reducing it to zero; the genesis of knowledge, its essence and content are all
\nattributed to things that are of the nature of factors and causes; reasons themselves are
\neventually reduced to causes, such that reasons are eliminated altogether. This is the full
\nand ultimate relativist position.
\nAt the opposite end, we have the position of the pre-Kantian philosophers and
\nscholars, as well as Islamic thinkers. They see the role of cause in producing knowledge as
\namounting to next to nothing or being of only rare or passing significance; instead, they
\nconsider reason to be determining and crucial.
\nHence, it\u2019s more useful if we define our categories in these terms and say that
\nrelativism or relativist epistemology is an epistemology which believes in caused knowledge
\n(explanation); and non-relativist epistemology is an epistemology which believes in
\nreasoned knowledge (justification). These are two ideal types and form the opposite ends of
\nthe spectrum. All along the spectrum, you\u2019ll find many different combinations and variations,
\nand in these instances your epistemology will differ in accordance with whether you attach
\noverall importance to causes or reasons.
\nI\u2019d, therefore, like to amend your question a bit, in as much as the sharp distinction
\nyou drew probably never occurs in practice. I think it would be more appropriate to say that,
\nwhen you look at a thinker\u2019s views, you may find that they are more inclined to favour causes
\nover reasons, whereas the reverse may be the case when you take another thinker.
\nSpeaking for myself, I\u2019ve never dared, in my own mind, to reduce the role of reason to zero
\nand I earnestly believe that reasons definitely play a role in the attainment of knowledge, as
\nwell as in affirming, undermining and amending judgements; although I am, at the same
\ntime, by no means oblivious to the role of causes. All the discoveries that have been made
\nin the field of epistemology since the 18th century – which have tipped the scale against
\nreason – have been in the realm of causes and concerned new examples of epistemological
\ncauses; that is, causes that play a role in the attainment, generation and transformation of
\nknowledge.
\nStarting from the time when Francis Bacon spoke about the idols and fallacies of
\ncavemen, to Marx\u2019s remarks about ideology, to the views of the post-modernists, everyone
\nhas been investigating and elevating causes and denigrating reasons. And they have all
\ndemonstrated in one way or another how non-rational factors (of the nature of causes) play
\ngames with rationality (and reasons), thereby distorting and tarnishing it. The role of culture,
\ngeography, emotions, interests, internal and genetic factors, the unconscious, power and the
\nlike in distorting and influencing perception and consciousness is undeniable. When you
\nlook at Freud, Foucault and Habermas, in effect they all belong to the same camp. They all
\npoint to factors that play a part in shaping, altering and amending knowledge. Freud is
\ninterested in unconscious factors (egocentric rationalisations). Foucault is particularly
\ninterested in social factors and \u00ab power \u00bb (power-centric rationalisations). And Habermas
\nfocuses on human interests (interest-centric rationalisations). But we can categorise all
\nthese things under the same heading: causes.
\nOn the other side, the rationalist philosophers, such as Descartes, can be described
\nas philosophers who are, first and foremost, interested in reasons and believe that a
\njudgement can be swayed this way or that by reasons.
\nOn this basis, we can say that post-modernism consists of the appearance or
\nestablishment of a period in the realm of knowledge and culture when reasons have been
\nabandoned in favour of causes, and when reasons are denied any share or role.
\nIn the midst of all this, my own epistemological position, put briefly, is that reasons
\nplay a role in the attainment of knowledge and its contents; however, when reasons have
\ncompleted their work and arrived at parity, causes then come into play. In other words, after
\nyou have rejected a number of views on the basis of reasoning and kept a number of others,
\nyou will ultimately be left with a number of views that are equally tenable. This is the point
\nwhen cause may intervene (or will per force intervene), lending credence to one of the views
\nover the others based on causes, not reasons. Hence, both reasons and causes play a part
\nin the realm of knowledge. It may also happen on occasion that the reasons are strong
\nenough from the start to eliminate all the rivals, leaving only a single view in place. But if the
\nreasons are such that they cannot overcome one another, you will undoubtedly arrive at a
\nreasoned pluralism, which is different from a relativist or post-modernist pluralism that is
\ncausal. And this is a crucial and profound difference.
\nThis, in brief, is my epistemological position. Hence, we should have no further need
\nfor the term \u00ab relativist \u00bb and the like, and we can speak in accordance with our own
\nterminology and framework. I believe that pure relativism is based on pure causality,
\nepistemologically-speaking, while reasoned pluralism falls midway along the spectrum and
\nraw rationalism lies at the opposite end. Hence, pluralism forms the midway mark and it
\nconsists of the remaining justified views, on which causal selection may then operate. At
\none end of the spectrum, you\u2019ll find views based on reasons pure and simple. At the
\nopposite extreme, you\u2019ll have views that are based only on causes. And midway between
\nthe two lies reasoned pluralism, which assigns roles to both causes and reasons, as well as
\nmaking clear the relationship between the two.
\nQ. If I understand you correctly, what you\u2019re saying is that we have at least two<\/strong>
\ntypes of pluralism: one pluralism arises from the very nature of the reasoning, that is<\/strong>
\nto say, the reasons point to different conclusions; we also have another type of<\/strong>
\npluralism which occurs with the intervention of causes, once we have reached parity<\/strong>
\nof reasoning. In other words, at times, we seek to understand something and arrive at<\/strong>
\na plurality of interpretations, whereas at other times we arrive at a parity of reasoning<\/strong>
\nand then causes direct us towards a plurality of views.<\/strong>
\nA. You referred to different interpretations. I wanted to leave that for later. That is to
\nsay, we also have a hermeneutic pluralism. I call this interpretative pluralism, as opposed to
\ncaused pluralism or reasoned pluralism. In other words, when we embark on interpretation
\nand hermeneutics, we encounter a particular type of pluralism, which we must discuss in its
\nown place. For the time being, I am speaking about non-hermeneutic thinking. At any rate,
\nwe have not only explanatory (causal) views and justified (reasoned) views, we also have
\ninterpretative views. And they all fall under the rubric of epistemological pluralism. And, as I
\nsaid earlier, this epistemological pluralism inevitably affects our understanding of religion and
\nreligious knowledge. This is the destiny of religion and religious understanding.
\nQ. If we assume that a believer is of the view that his religious teachings tell<\/strong>
\nhim that his religion is true and all other religions are false – and that this is one of the<\/strong>
\nessential principles of his religion – can this person accept pluralism or not? Do we<\/strong>
\nhave to say that the question of pluralism and our stance towards it takes precedence<\/strong>
\nover and has to precede the acceptance of a particular religion?<\/strong>
\nA. To my mind, your question is analogous to someone asking themselves the
\nfollowing question: if a religion or school of thought contains the principle of predestination
\nand if a believer follows that religion and finds this intra-religious principle straightforward and
\nnot open to interpretation, then what is that believer to do about their extra-religious
\njudgements about predestination and free will? That fact of the matter is that we have to
\ndistinguish between imitative religiosity and thoughtful or scholarly religiosity. Pluralism is for
\nthoughtful believers, not imitative believers. Imitative believers, who are in the majority, turn
\nto a particular religion without amending or assessing the assumptions and foundations that
\nunderpin the understanding of religion. And, since their approach is imitative, they are not
\nconcerned about extra-religious judgements; hence, their initial and final conceptions are
\none and the same. It is scholarly believers who are concerned about extra-religious views
\nand judgements. And, if they arrive at a judgement outside religion and are persuaded by it,
\nthey will undoubtedly take it on board in their intra-religious thinking. There are examples of
\nthis in the history of theology and religious philosophy. Pluralism, too, is an epistemological
\ndebate that has theological implications and it is incumbent on scholarly believers to address
\nit as an extra-religious question that impinges on their intra-religious ideas. This is the
\nnature of thought and investigation. Do we not expect the same of Buddhists and Jews?
\nWe say that there are certain views in Islam that are extra-religious for them. If they find
\nthese views convincing and accept them, and if they clash with their intra-religious views, the
\nrational expectation is for them to reconsider and reassess their religious ideas. (Of course,
\nthis reassessment would only apply to a small number of issues; if many things turned out to
\nneed reassessment, one would begin to lose faith in that religion.) This is in the nature of
\nscholarly religiosity and the question of pluralism is addressed to scholars.
\nThe debate about pluralism concerns gnostic religiosity, not pragmatic religiosity.
\nAnd the clash between the external affirmation of pluralism and its intra-religious denial is of
\nthe nature of the clash between philosophy and religion, or science and religion. The
\nsolution is always the same: constant, historical, collective assessment by the community of
\nscholarly believers.
\nQ. Possibly one of the most significant criticisms directed at pluralism<\/strong>
\nconcerns the relationship between truth and falsehood. Some people are apparently<\/strong>
\nof the view that, when we grant official recognition to a plurality of religions, we are<\/strong>
\neffectively saying that all religions are true or, at least, that they all have a share of the<\/strong>
\ntruth. It seems on occasion that your interpretation of pluralism is that we can find a<\/strong>
\nshare of the truth in different religions.<\/strong>
\nAlso, would it be possible for someone to reach the extra-religious conclusion<\/strong>
\nthat no belief can ever be taken to be the absolute truth yet still maintain, at the intrareligious<\/strong>
\nlevel, that their own religion is the absolute truth? Or, to put it all more<\/strong>
\nsimply, what is your position on the truth?<\/strong>
\nA. There are several questions here that I must answer separately. First, we have to
\nmake it clear in our own minds that attaining certitude is a simple matter and all this haggling
\nover certitude is not very productive. We have two kinds of certitude: caused and reasoned.
\nThere are many instances of caused certainty and the certitude of most believers – or the
\naverage believer – is caused. That is to say, certain causes (education, family, emotions,
\npublicity, etc.) have put them in a particular mental state, which we call \u00ab dogmatic
\nconviction \u00bb, and the same causes perpetuate this mental state. Other causes can, in turn,
\ndestroy this mental state and supplant it with another. Creating this kind of caused certainty
\nis not difficult at all. And most religious certitudes are of this type. It is in this way that Shi\u2019is
\nfeel absolute conviction in Shi\u2019ism, Sunnis in Sunnism, Jews in Judaism and so on. These
\nare all caused, inherited, inculcated, simple, inexpensive and plentiful certainties. It is
\npossible to create a tight climate of inculcation, to frighten the mind with religious
\npropaganda, deprive believers of free will and choice, and to render virtually meaningless the
\ncall to religion which is based on free choice. And this is a point for preachers and religious
\nthinkers to bear in mind: they shouldn\u2019t sacrifice the call at the altar of insistent inculcation or
\nassume that they are one and the same thing.
\nHowever, we have another, superior kind of certitude and that is reasoned certitude.
\nIt has to be said that this type of certitude is rare indeed in all areas of human thought and
\nespecially in religion. We can even cite intra-religious sources on this. It has been stated in
\nour religious narratives that certitude is one of the rarest blessings granted to human beings.
\nHence, haggling endlessly over certitude is, in my opinion, pointless, because in real life that
\ntrue, reasoned certitude is hard to come by in all areas, including religion. And that other
\ncaused, unreasoned certitude is plentiful in all areas, including religion. Caused certitude
\nmay be attained in a minute, whereas reasoned certitude may remain out of reach over a
\nlifetime. (We\u2019ll set aside for now that in many cases it amounts to nothing more than a
\ncompound suspicion anyway, as Ibn Sina put it.)
\nThere is, of course, a third kind of certitude, a revelational, divine, direct certitude
\nwhich is specific to God\u2019s chosen ones, but that needn\u2019t concern us here; it is, at any rate,
\neven rarer than rare.
\nNow, even that same kind of caused, unreasoned certitude (which is, in fact, not
\ncertitude at all) is acceptable to the Legislator and he is prepared to accept it from believers.
\nOtherwise, believers\u2019 duties would become unbearable. The prophets knew that the faith of
\nthe bulk of the people could be shaken and destroyed by the slimmest of doubts. This is
\nwhy, they forbade the circulation of irreligious causes and factors in a religious society. It
\nwas because of the love and compassion they felt for believers. They knew that the people\u2019s
\nfaith was vulnerable and considered it their duty to protect it. And they were prepared to
\naccept as faith even that uncertain, tremulous version. For, everything that is human must
\nfall within the capacity of human beings and be endurable to them, including faith, religiosity
\nand certitude.
\nAnd, to those people who suggest that theological debates damage people\u2019s faith and
\ncertainties, I have to say: which certainties? Do they mean those tremulous, caused,
\nunreasoned, inherited, imitative certainties? But they\u2019ve not been attained through learned
\ndebates and reasoning to be shaken by them. They are products of causes, only likely to be
\ndestroyed by other causes. And if they mean reasoned certainties, theological debates are
\ntheir begetter and creator, and closing the door to theology and free debate because of its
\npossible pitfalls is like crushing a flower for fear of its thorns. On this basis, the religious
\ncommunity must be prepared to distinguish between their cause-oriented opponents and
\ntheir reason-oriented ones. Why should opposing theologians and thinkers not be allowed to
\nbe free? If there is any room for concern, it has to do with the cause-oriented people, not the
\nreason-oriented ones. This is something that surely even a traditional religious mind can
\ndigest with a bit of thought and study. Of course, if we look at it from the perspective of
\nmodern human rights, everyone should enjoy equal rights, be they proponents or opponents,
\nbe they cause-oriented people or reason-oriented ones. But we digress. At any rate, when
\nwe ourselves accept that even those whose faith is caused will be saved and go to heaven
\nand that even they are on the right path, why must we expect the moon and the sky from
\nothers and demand the impossible from them? How can we demand that everyone possess
\nreasoned faith?
\nQ. What you\u2019re saying concerns certainty, which is a subjective thing. But<\/strong>
\ntruth and falsehood are objective. Let us imagine that we reach the conclusion, for<\/strong>
\nexample, that we cannot definitively verify the correctness of any view. That is to say,<\/strong>
\neither we cannot arrive at the truth or, if we do arrive at it, we cannot recognise that<\/strong>
\nwe\u2019ve arrived at it. The upshot of this assertion is that there\u2019s no such thing as<\/strong>
\ndefinite, objective truth, and this includes the realm of religion. If we believe that<\/strong>
\nthere is no definite, objective truth, then we are in fact saying that we cannot arrive at<\/strong>
\nreasoned certainty either. And, if this is the case, it holds true everywhere, including<\/strong>
\nthe realm of religion. Also, if we consider a religion to be true, must we not consider<\/strong>
\nall other religions to be false?<\/strong>
\nA. Yes, it is as you say. If our epistemology rules out conclusive evidence and
\nverification, then it will also rule out reasoned certainty. However, in that case, we would
\narrive at pluralism at its most extreme and intense.
\nAs to truth and falsehood, there is an important point about religions that needs to be
\nstated here. On the whole, we say in logic that there is little distance between truth and
\nfalsehood or between affirmation and refutation or between diametrically opposed positions.
\nIn other words, we are rejecting a third possibility or elevating diametric opposition, such that
\nwe assume that if there is a truth, it must have an opposite, which is false; if there is
\nsomething that is right, it has an opposite, which is wrong. Some people view the truth and
\nfalsehood of religions in these terms; in other words, they believe that the relationship
\nbetween a true religion and other religions is one of diametric opposition. However, the mere
\nfact that there are numerous religions indicates that this is not the case. In other words, the
\ntruth of one does not falsify all the others. The problem is much more complicated than this
\nlogical over-simplification. They are saying, how can two diametrically opposed things both
\nbe accepted? How can two different religions be considered true? If it is stated in one
\nreligion, for example, that \u00ab Jesus Christ is the last of the prophets \u00bb and, in another, that
\n\u00abJesus Christ is not the last\u00bb, or if it is said in one place that Muhammad, peace be upon
\nhim, is the prophet and, elsewhere, that he is not, how can these two positions both be held
\nto be right? whereas, since one of them contradicts the other, one of them must definitely be
\ntrue and the other false.
\nBut here we have to bear in mind, first, that we are not talking about two propositions;
\neach religion is a complete system, that is, a vast collection of propositions whereby each
\nproposition is linked to many other propositions. In other words, in the real world, we never
\ncompare just two single propositions; it is two systems or two aggregates that are subjected
\nto comparison. And these two systems are bound with their vast collection of propositions,
\nmaking it very difficult to conclude that they are diametric opposites. Each of these systems
\nhas strong points and weak points when it comes to the interpretation of facts and
\nexperiences, providing spiritual comfort, solving problems, etc. And, once things are looked
\nat in this way, it becomes much more difficult than it seemed at first to set one above the
\nother. In fact, they become more like antinomies. That is to say, deciding the exact sense in
\nwhich they contradict each other and establishing their truth and falsehood become very
\ndifficult.
\nFor example, let us take as our two systems idealism and realism or nominalism and
\nrealism (in the second sense of realism). They are like two schools of thought. It is not as if
\none of them says the world is real, the other says it isn\u2019t or one of them says there is a
\nuniversal, the other says there isn\u2019t, allowing us to conclude that they are diametric
\nopposites, with one of them being true and the other false. The truth of the matter is that
\nthey are two philosophical systems. Each one has a host of assumptions and implications.
\nEach one has strengths and weaknesses in explaining phenomena. An individual may
\nultimately choose one over the other but there won\u2019t be sufficient rational reasons to discount
\neither. In fact, in the course of assessing the relative strengths and weaknesses of each of
\nthe two systems, in terms of their capacity for explaining phenomena and their supporting
\narguments, they can appear in so many different lights and the philosopher\u2019s understanding
\nof them can undergo such transformations that making a definitive decision about them
\nwould be difficult indeed. And this is the key to the longevity of the disputes between
\nidealism and realism or nominalism and realism. Hence, we have to hold on to this systemic
\nperspective and look at propositions within their framework and not outside it.
\nThe second and more important point is that the tale of religions is not one wherein
\none is intrinsically true and all the others intrinsically false. There is no such intrinsic
\nopposition between them (as there is between two diametric opposites). Religions
\nthemselves do not make such a claim. That is to say, Muslims do not suggest that
\nChristianity is diametrically opposed to Islam or Judaism diametrically opposed to
\nChristianity. They say, each of them were true in their own time. In other words, they
\nacknowledge a kind of plurality and they don\u2019t consider any one of them to be intrinsically
\nfalse; instead, they see them all as true, with a qualification. Hence, they say, this one is
\ntrue and that one is true and that other one is true.
\nThis is an important point: we must bear in mind that we are not confronting
\ndiametric opposites or logically contradictory positions. We do not have to say one of them
\nis intrinsically true and all the others are absolutely false because they contradict it.
\nIn the opinion of believers themselves, all religions can be viewed as true with certain
\nqualifications. A is true during period A; B, during period B; C, during period C; and so on.
\nIf it is possible, with this qualification, to say that A is true and B is also true and C is also
\ntrue, then why shouldn\u2019t it be possible to add other qualifications that would allow us to say
\nthat they are all true? This single qualification has put us in a position whereby we can say
\nthat \u00ab A \u00bb, for example, was true until the first century, \u00ab B \u00bb was true from the first century
\nuntil, let us say, 606 on the Christian calendar and \u00ab C \u00bb from 606 to the present day.
\nHence, we have three truths that do not contradict each other, as long as we bear in mind
\nthe time qualification. However, is a time qualification the only possible qualification? Why
\nshouldn\u2019t it be possible to find other qualifications that would allow all of them to be true at
\nonce? Here, the only limitation is the extent of our imagination and power of creative
\nthinking.
\nThe fact of the matter is that the truth of religions is very similar to the truth of
\nindexical propositions. The truth and veracity of such propositions depends on who is saying
\nthem and in what context. The proposition \u00ab I am 20 years old \u00bb is true if it\u2019s being said by a
\n20-year-old person and it\u2019s false if it is said by a 40-year-old person. \u00ab It is cold today \u00bb is
\ntrue if it\u2019s said on a cold day and false if it\u2019s said on a warm day. Truth and veracity in the
\ncase of statements of this kind, which are known as indexical propositions, hinge on the \u00ab for
\nme \u00bb or \u00ab for him \u00bb and are, in this specific sense, relative. Whereas \u00ab the earth is
\nspherical \u00bb and \u00ab metals expand when subjected to heat \u00bb are not relatively true and do not
\nhinge on any \u00ab for me \u00bb or \u00ab for him \u00bb; it makes no difference who says them.
\nNow, \u00ab for Christians, Christianity was true until the advent of Islam \u00bb is true for
\nMuslims. \u00ab For Jews, Judaism was true until the advent of Christianity \u00bb is true for Christians
\nand Muslims. This kind of truth is by no means the same as scientific or philosophical truths,
\nwhich are not qualified by \u00ab for Harry \u00bb or \u00ab for Joe \u00bb. Hence, the question of truth and
\nfalsehood for religions is different from the absolute and intrinsic truth and falsehood of
\nphilosophy, which holds that either something is absolutely correct or it is not; either the atom
\nexists or it does not, there is no question here of whether it is today or tomorrow or whether
\nyou\u2019re in the north or the south. This being the case, you now have to find some other
\nformula or qualification that will allow all religions to be true alongside one another. You
\nmay, for example, say, for Christians who are unaware of Islam or who do not recognise
\nIslam as true, Christianity holds true. There\u2019s nothing logically or religiously objectionable
\nabout this remark. Don\u2019t say, Islam is true, therefore everything else is false. This statement
\narises from the same kind of illusion that holds that the truth of Islam is like the truth of
\natomic theory or the truth of the earth\u2019s spherical shape. The model of truth has to be
\nchanged. Here we are dealing with indexical models; that is to say, \u00ab truth for… \u00bb, not
\nabsolute truth. And do not imagine that this means that Christians may be excused for being
\nChristians. After all, was it the case that Christians before the advent of Islam were to be
\nexcused? No, there is nothing for them to be excused for; they were and are following a
\ntrue religion of rightful guidance and salvation. This is how it is in the realm of religion. They
\nare all true with certain qualifications and, if we bring these qualifications to bear, there\u2019s
\nnothing wrong with having a plurality of truths.
\nThe conclusion I want to draw is this: The people who say that there is something
\nwrong with a plurality of truth are thinking of truth and falsehood as diametric opposites;
\nwhereas here it is not a question of diametric opposites, it is a question of the difference
\nbetween two indexical systems. The distinguished people who raise the idea of excusing
\npeople are mistaken. They are well meaning and wish to exonerate God and reassure God\u2019s
\ncreatures! May God bless them. At any rate, we have to avoid confusing \u00ab truth \u00bb and
\n\u00ab truth for… \u00bb.
\nQ. When we speak about a religion\u2019s truth, presumably we have to extend this<\/strong>
\nto its elements. In other words, the truth of the relevant beliefs, the truth of its<\/strong>
\npractices and rituals, the truth of its ethics and so on. Now, let us imagine that we are<\/strong>
\nconcerned with the realm of beliefs and that beliefs are factual in nature, that is to<\/strong>
\nsay, they point to certain facts or realities. If we say, these beliefs are true for one<\/strong>
\ngroup, but not for another, then it would see that you\u2019re presenting a particular model<\/strong>
\nof the truth, which we might call \u00ab qualified truth \u00bb. In other words, one group<\/strong>
\nconsiders a certain thing to be true on the basis of certain assumptions and ideas,<\/strong>
\nwhereas another group arrives at a different conclusion based on different premises.<\/strong>
\nHence, there\u2019s no such thing as a priori truth; truth is the outcome of a process or a<\/strong>
\nmethod.<\/strong>
\nYou are, in fact, presenting a particular model of the truth in which there\u2019s no<\/strong>
\nabsolute truth. And if we accept this general ruling, it would apply to religions as<\/strong>
\nwell.<\/strong>
\nA. I didn\u2019t say there are no instances of absolute truth. I said, alongside absolute
\ntruth, we also have to think about indexical truth or \u00ab truth for… \u00bb. As far as propositions
\npertaining to facts are concerned, there\u2019s no such thing as \u00ab truth for… \u00bb, be it in the realm of
\nreligion or anywhere else. They\u2019re like atomic theory, which is either true or false and
\ndoesn\u2019t depend on Harry or Joe. But don\u2019t forget, first, that we are looking at religions as
\nsystems, not as separate elements, as I explained. Secondly, we are talking about religions
\nthat have, one way or another, emerged tried and tested and about which we have attained
\nparity of reasoning. That is to say, the logical or philosophical mind cannot rule them out
\nabsolutely. It is this initial, minimum level of truth that paves the way for \u00ab truth for… \u00bb. This
\nsame indexical truth can point to the right path and salvation.
\nQ. Then you have to define \u00ab truth \u00bb. Do you see it as correspondence to<\/strong>
\nreality or something else?<\/strong>
\nA. Truth means correspondence to reality, at any rate – in both cases. But truth in
\nreligion entails its pointing out the right path. When we say, \u00ab true religion for Harry \u00bb, we
\nmean \u00ab the religion that shows the right path to Harry \u00bb, not a religion that is false and whose
\nfollowers are going astray and are to be excused.
\nQ. Does the question of following the right path or going astray that is<\/strong>
\nmentioned in religion entail truth and falsehood?<\/strong>
\nA. It entails truth and falsehood in the sense I mentioned. Nonetheless, there\u2019s an
\naddendum to all this that we must deal with later.
\nQ. Perhaps one of the reasons why the critics focus on this issue of truth and<\/strong>
\nfalsehood is that their model of truth is fundamentally different from yours. That is to<\/strong>
\nsay, they assume an absolute truth – without any qualification – that either falls into<\/strong>
\nyour lap or doesn\u2019t.<\/strong>
\nA. Yes, what they\u2019re saying is that this proposition is true, hence, its opposite is false
\nand nonsensical; so you\u2019ve either arrived at this truth or you haven\u2019t and you only have
\nthese two alternatives. But, as we saw, truth and falsehood in religion are qualified (or
\nindexical), even in the opinion of the followers of religions themselves. One qualification is
\nthe familiar time qualification, but we may be able to think of another dozen qualifications.
\nHence, pluralism grows naturally in the field of religion.
\nLet me remind you that pluralism is a result of reaching an impasse on differences,
\nnot on similarities. The mistake some people have made is to say, yes, we, too, believe that
\nthere is a certain amount of truth in Christianity, and what they means is that they believe in
\nsome of the things we do. But it has to be said in all earnest that this is not pluralism, this is
\nmonism. In other words, they believe in an absolute truth and, since others seem to
\nacknowledge a part of that same truth, they say, we accept them as well. But this is not
\nwhere the argument arises. This is a non-issue. With pluralism, the argument is about
\ndifferences; in other words, the points on which there are disagreements. So, if we imagine
\nthat, in Judaism and Islam and a number of other religions, you find a similar belief in one
\nGod, then the question of pluralism doesn\u2019t even arise on this point. Pluralism becomes an
\nissue when you assume that, in Judaism, God is said to have attributes which are, for
\nexample, different from the attributes depicted in Islam. When we go beyond propositions
\nthat pertain to facts, we reach religious practices and secondary commands, as well as moral
\nprecepts. Here, it is not a question of truth and falsehood. In this case, the practices of the
\nfollowers of a true religion (in the above-mentioned sense) are free of blame and acceptable
\nto God and lead to salvation, blessings and felicity.
\nQ. In other words, here you\u2019re taking truth to mean effectiveness?<\/strong>
\nA. Yes, effectiveness, because we\u2019re dealing with normative affairs here, which are
\ninstrumental.
\nQ. So, all that\u2019s left is the factual parts, the parts that pertain to reality, which<\/strong>
\nis basically the realm of beliefs (including beliefs about the beginning and the end).<\/strong>
\nA. The debate about pluralism and absolute truth occurs precisely in this area. The
\nquestion of pluralism doesn\u2019t really arise on more practical matters, which are generally easy
\nto assess and accept. The problems occur in the realm of beliefs and this is where the
\ndebates become heated and intense. I must remind you again that, here, pluralism arises
\nwhen we have arrived at a parity of reasoning and when the religious mind has reached an
\nimpasse. Let me also say that, apart from the question of the beginning and the end,
\nsomeone may claim that the issue of whether person A is a prophet or not also pertains to
\nreality and facts. What would we say here? We have to say that prophethood in the sense
\nof a mission (not in the sense of having specific qualities) is of the nature of \u00ab truth for… \u00bb.
\nHence person A may be a prophet for one community (with the qualifications already
\nmentioned) and not for another community. In other words, a particular community may or
\nmay not have person A as their prophet.
\nAs to the question of the beginning mentioned in religion, it is something on which
\nwords fall into contradiction in expressing it. That is to say, contradiction is the order of the
\nday. God is a mystery. God is the mystery beyond all mysteries. As Mowlavi puts it:
\n\u00ab When the scent of the Beloved fills the air\/all the tongues stumble and err \u00bb.
\nWords inevitably fail us here and it is not at all impossible or it is even very likely that
\ndifferent and contradictory rulings are made, with every one of them being true; true, albeit
\ncontradictory. Here we are facing a fact that the tongue cannot tame, like an elephant that
\ndrops in for tea at a hen\u2019s house, thus wrecking the house and astounding the hen.
\nQ. This is the intra-religious perspective. What if we want to look at it from the<\/strong>
\nextra-religious perspective, what then?<\/strong>
\nA. No, I\u2019m presenting the absolute, mystical position here; I\u2019m not relying on any
\nspecific religion.
\nJust take a look at Stace, who apparently did not follow any particular religion;
\nnonetheless, he was aware of spiritual experiences, respected them and thought they were
\nsignificant. One of the results of his research and investigations was precisely that the
\nlanguage of mystics reveals that there are areas or aspects of reality which, the closer you
\ncome to them, the more you fall into contradictions. This is not confined to experiences of
\nGod. Most spiritual and mystical experiences produce a similar state. Apart from God, there
\nis the question of resurrection (or the experience of resurrection). Resurrection is an intrareligious
\nteaching and it can vary with the number of religions. Its truth follows from the truth
\nof the religion itself, based on what we\u2019ve said so far.
\nQ. Let us imagine that we have two belief systems and that these belief<\/strong>
\nsystems are made up of propositions. Let us then understand the meaning of the<\/strong>
\npropositions in their own context. Once we have understood the propositions, we<\/strong>
\nfind that one groups says that God is majestic, whereas the other group says that God<\/strong>
\nis not majestic. In other words, based on an aggregate of shared assumptions, we<\/strong>
\nmay reach the conclusion that God is not majestic and, based on a series of other<\/strong>
\nassumptions, we may decide that God is majestic. This depends entirely on our<\/strong>
\npremises and assumptions. But is it possible, within a single belief system and based<\/strong>
\non a single aggregate of shared assumptions, to say that God is both majestic and not<\/strong>
\nmajestic?<\/strong>
\nA. No, it isn\u2019t possible. But this isn\u2019t what pluralism is about. Pluralism is saying that
\nyou may have several sets of premises and, based on these several sets of premises, you
\ncan have several sets of arguments. Pluralism doesn\u2019t amount to the suggestion that you
\ncan come to several contradictory conclusions within a single system. This is impossible.
\nBut you can have several systems. Of course, you didn\u2019t opt for these systems arbitrarily
\neither. First of all, their foundations are sound and well argued and you\u2019ve reached the point
\nof choosing between them. Secondly, the issue in question and the object of knowledge
\nhere being God, it is inevitable that the language and the theoretical system fall into
\ncontradictions. This causes the appearance of something called pluralism.
\nQ. And if we assume that one of the prerequisites of rationality is the absence<\/strong>
\nof contradiction, can we consider these contradictory statements to be rational?<\/strong>
\nA. The danger here is that we are equating rationality with the limits of our
\ncomprehension. We may be dismissing something as irrational and impossible because we
\ncannot comprehend it. In truth, we should put possibility and rationality in context. When the
\nobject of discussion and knowledge is God, the rationality of the ideas and propositions is
\ndifferent from the rationality of the propositions pertaining to nature. We are talking about a
\nmystery; hence, we should not be astounded when we run into apparent contradictions. In
\nthe Koran, you find the verse: \u00ab When thou threwest (a handful of dust), it was not Thy act,
\nbut Allah\u2019s \u00bb, in which the throwing is and is not ascribed to the Prophet in one and the same
\nbreath. And what a host of debates and ruminations this has led to. The relationship
\nbetween this truth and human beings is unreasoned. When it is formulated into reasoned
\npropositions, it falls into contradictions. And these contradictions do not contravene
\nrationality in view of the context. This is where figurative speech enters in.
\nQ. Hence, you see the language of religion in the sphere of beliefs as<\/strong>
\npertaining to reality and facts?<\/strong>
\nA. Yes, but this doesn\u2019t prevent us from resorting to figurative speech and analogies;
\nwhereupon we may also fall into contradictions.
\nQ. Does the amazement and confusion felt in the face God only lead to<\/strong>
\ndifferences between religions? Or can it lead to contradictions and hence different<\/strong>
\ninterpretations within the same religion, such as Islam?<\/strong>
\nA. It can for scholars, but not for imitators.
\nQ. But we see that religious commentators always try to resolve<\/strong>
\ncontradictions; or, at least at one level of understanding, they try to iron out any<\/strong>
\ncontradictions.<\/strong>
\nA. Of course, all the contradictions need to be resolved in a philosophical-scientific
\nsystem. But mysticism does not balk at contradictions; it has learnt to make do with them.
\nThis is why the language of mystics should not be seen as a rigorous, philosophical
\nlanguage. Otherwise, the contradictions would jar and you\u2019d reject the system out of hand.
\nIn fact, this is why mystics do not have a system. A system has to be harmonious. Mystics
\nhave never created a disciplined theoretical system. They have opted for the language of
\nanalogy and interpretation. And they have chosen this language not out of a sense of duty,
\nbut because of the nature of the subject. They could not have done otherwise. This was
\nwhy we spoke about a propositional language and an indexical language. The language of
\nreligion and mysticism, when it speaks of God, is an indexical language and it has a different
\nset of rules from propositional language.
\nQ. But we have to know how we\u2019re to understand religious teachings. For<\/strong>
\nexample, God tells us about the existing world or resurrection or perdition. Are we to<\/strong>
\nunderstand these things in a philosophical way or a mystical way? In other words, do<\/strong>
\nwe have to assume that these teachings are all harmonious and interpret them as<\/strong>
\nsuch or not? This brings us to the issue of the \u00ab essence of religion \u00bb . What, then, is<\/strong>
\nthe essence of religion and what does it dictate in these circumstances?<\/strong>
\nA. We have to recognise at least three types of \u00ab religion \u00bb or religiosity: imitative (or
\nutilitarian) religiosity, scholarly-theological (gnostic) religiosity, and mystical (experiential)
\nreligiosity. For the imitators, the essence of religion consists of its must dos and must not
\ndos and the simple ethical rules of daily life. As far as the imitators are concerned, religion is
\nfor life, not life for religion. Hence, if anyone abandons these must dos and must not dos,
\nthey are considered to be irreligious. There are no signs of either the mental rigours of the
\ngnostic nor the moving experiences of the mystic here. And obeying the Prophet means
\nobeying his must dos and must not dos. These people do not try to relive the prophet\u2019s
\nexperiences, nor share in his passionate concerns and revelations. This is what the essence
\nof religion amounts to for the imitators. But, for others, this essence, is merely the
\nsuperficies. Higher up than this, we have theological-scholarly religiosity and, higher up still,
\nwe have mystical religiosity. For the mystics, the essence of religion consists of its spiritual
\nand illuminatory experiences. For theologians, the essence of religion is its teachings (such
\nas God\u2019s commandments, the question of prayer, the problem of evil, creation, resurrection
\nand so on), which must be rendered harmonious so that they can accept them in a
\nphilosophical manner. For each level of religiosity, the lower level constitutes the superficies.
\nHence, we have three interpretations of religion or three different types of religiosity.
\nAlthough there is no contradiction between them, they are by no means the same. The
\nessence is different in each case.
\nNow, if we return to the question of how we\u2019re to interpret religious propositions
\npertaining to purgatory, resurrection and the beyond, it would depend entirely on our
\nreligiosity and our premises or assumptions. The history of religion reveals that the bulk of
\nthe people or the imitators have taken them in a literal and instrumental way (that is to say,
\nthe interest of beliefs is that they aid the attainment of blessings and felicity). The
\ntheologians have adopted a less crude approach and, based on their premises, have, on
\noccasion represented the measure of our deeds on judgement day in the form of an
\nordinary, worldly scale and, on other occasions, offered more delicate interpretations. And
\nmuch the same can be said of the mystics.
\nThe three types of religiosity, in fact, lead to three types of religion and three
\ninterpretations of the other world. This is where the allegorical and non-allegorical elements,
\nwhich exist in every religion, have entered into religious debates. At the very least, we have
\nto say that many of the debates about the characteristics and qualities of God, judgement
\nday and the like are allegorical in nature and they can be clarified with reference to the nonallegorical
\nelements (or the underlying assumptions). Since these assumptions may change,
\nthe interpretation of the allegories may also change.
\nQ. We find ourselves faced with different religious books that want to tell us<\/strong>
\nsomething, for example, about aspects of the world that are unknown to us. Now, the<\/strong>
\nquestion is this: aren\u2019t there any methods, based on historical reasoning, that would<\/strong>
\nallow us to demonstrate that one of these books is more credible than the others,<\/strong>
\nthereby creating a kind of linear or inclusive pluralism? In other words, we could say,<\/strong>
\nfor example, that these religions were true, but that the truthful books that were sent<\/strong>
\nto them by God have, for example, been distorted in some way or have had large parts<\/strong>
\nof them destroyed. But our book is, let us say, totally complete and undistorted. And<\/strong>
\nwe also have other evidence and material that assists us in understanding this book<\/strong>
\ncorrectly; whereas the more ancient books do not have these advantages.<\/strong>
\nIsn\u2019t it possible, in other words, to say, in a conditional way, that, out of all the<\/strong>
\nreligious books that remain, this one has been better preserved and there is a clear<\/strong>
\nhistory documenting it, whereas this isn\u2019t the case with the other books. Hence, while<\/strong>
\nwe\u2019re not dismissing the other books as false (although they are incomplete and<\/strong>
\npossibly distorted), nonetheless we\u2019re saying that the book that we are following is,<\/strong>
\nfor example, more comprehensive, and we base our claim on objective historical<\/strong>
\nstudies, not on our religious faith. Hence, we\u2019re not concerning ourselves with proof<\/strong>
\n(in itself); in other words, we\u2019re not saying that this religion is true, the other is false.<\/strong>
\nWhat we\u2019re saying is that, at the level of verification (for us), given these religions,<\/strong>
\nscriptures and texts, this religion is the most credible and accurately preserved on<\/strong>
\nthe basis of sound historical arguments.<\/strong>
\nA. If you make your claim conditional, that\u2019s fine. But as soon as you start trying to
\nflesh it out, you\u2019ll run into pluralism. If – and only if – you could establish, based on reasoned
\narguments, that one religion or one scripture is definitely superior to the others, then no
\nintelligent person would turn to the inferior ones. This is what the whole argument is about.
\nWhat has happened in practice is that everyone is claiming that their religion is the superior
\none. It is this multiplicity of superiors that has given rise to pluralism.
\nQ. Of course, in a way, we can flesh out our argument. In the context of the for<\/strong>
\nus, we can say, for example, that we have a better-documented and more reliable<\/strong>
\nhistory of a particular prophet. Or we can show in a well-argued way that there are<\/strong>
\nbetter-preserved sources supporting the newer religion than the older religion, and<\/strong>
\nthat the material at our disposal is more voluminous. This can apply to both the<\/strong>
\nscripture and the prophet and other revered figures of a particular religion.<\/strong>
\nA. Look, pluralism comes into play when we\u2019ve rejected everything that we can
\npossibly reject on the basis of reasoning and evidence. Ultimately, we\u2019ve been left with a
\nnumber of religions of more or less equal standing. This is where we ask ourselves: first, do
\nwe really have a plurality of this kind or can we still drive out all but one of them? And,
\nsecondly, if we really are faced with this plurality, what approach must we adopt to it,
\npractically and theoretically? This is the why and wherefore of pluralism. We must also
\nconstantly bear in mind that what pluralism is suggesting is not that all possible and existing
\nstatements and claims are of equal weight and standing, and everything that anyone says is
\ntrue. This is patently nonsense. This is certainly not the claim we\u2019re making and no
\nintelligent person would believe such a thing.
\nQ. It might be a good idea to speak at greater length about something that<\/strong>
\ncame up during the discussion. It seems that one of the theoretical pillars of religious<\/strong>
\npluralism is a particular conception of the essence of religion. Do the numerous<\/strong>
\nreligions which are, let us say, more or less based on equally sound arguments, all<\/strong>
\nhave a single essence? Can we, in other words, speak of a generic similarity between<\/strong>
\nthem? Of course, you spoke about the essence of religion as existing on three<\/strong>
\ndifferent levels. But it may still be possible to press you further and ask, what is the<\/strong>
\nessence of religion and how would you define its relationship to pluralism?<\/strong>
\nA. Yes, I briefly explained that you can in fact adopt three approaches to any religion
\nand derive three different essences. But now we can look at it in another way.
\nThe first point is that we see religions as being dependent on the purveyors of
\nreligions, known as prophets. In some instances, \u00ab prophet \u00bb is not an appropriate term and
\nit would be more appropriate, for example, to speak of \u00ab founder \u00bb. Buddhists, for instance,
\nhave given the name Buddha to the founder of their religion which means the enlightened
\none. When Buddha achieved enlightenment, he was given the title Buddha.
\nThe second point is that these founders and prophets underwent certain experiences,
\nin the wake of which they presented their religions to the people. These experiences
\nestablished their personalities and today we see their religions as the product of their
\namazing personalities.
\nNow, everything depends on whether we want to see the differences between them
\nas being one of degree or of kind, and whether we see the differences between their
\nexperiences as one of degree or of kind. Establishing this matter of degree or kind is not
\npossible on the basis of reasoning. They are two different criteria; we must choose one and
\nto try to make it fit the relevant phenomena. No philosopher has ever demonstrated that all
\npigeons, all sparrows or all cats are of the same kind. And there is no way for them to have
\ndone so. Defining the criteria for it is impossible in the first instance (and I have explained
\nthis – which is a very important and delicate point – at length elsewhere). Mulla Sadra, for
\nexample, said that every individual is a kind onto themselves. He established the criteria for
\nselfhood and argued that it differs in every individual. This sits very well with his belief in the
\nprincipality of existence (something that is akin to nominalism).
\nIt also all depends on whether we\u2019re nominalists or realists. It\u2019s very difficult to settle
\nthe argument once and for all in favour of one of these philosophical positions; so it is a
\ndebate that rages to this day. Hence, it is possible, on the one hand, to take each prophet
\nas a kind onto themselves and to see prophets as all being of different kinds – ditto, their
\nexperiences – and to conclude that religions do not have a unified essence. Or, on the other
\nhand, to see the differences between them – and their experiences – as one of degree, and
\nconsider them to have benefited from varying degrees of excellence. It is also possible to
\ndismiss kind and essence altogether, in good nominalist fashion, and not to concern
\nourselves with them at all. Asking about the unified essence of religions only arises if we\u2019re
\nrealists and if we\u2019ve decided that religions are all of the same kind. Otherwise, why shouldn\u2019t
\nwe simply decide that each religion is a kind onto itself, refusing to speak of it as superior or
\ninferior, or just decide to be nominalists? Nominalism gives us pluralism, as does the view
\nthat every religion is a kind onto itself.
\nThe third alternative, which is founded on the idea of excellence and degree,
\narranges religions along a single line and considers them all to be of the same kind. There\u2019s
\nno other method for discovering the unified essence of religion – if we believe in it – than
\nreflection, observation and the like. But discovering their similarities can be carried out by
\ninduction, which is the method used by sociologists of religion.
\nOn the face of it, some of our mystics have favoured the third alternative; in other
\nwords, they considered the differences between prophets\u2019 experiences and revelations to be
\none of degree, not of kind. On this basis, they use the expression \u00ab the complete
\nMuhammadan revelation\u00bb. In other words, they believed that the other prophets had also
\nmade revelations, but that they were incomplete and that, when it came to the Prophet, he
\nmade \u00ab a complete revelation \u00bb. This is also the basis for the expression the Seal of the
\nProphets; by this they meant that, after the complete revelation, there can be no further or
\nhigher revelation.
\nNow, if we look at prophets\u2019 experiences in a pluralistic light and consider them to
\nhave been substantially different (either because we are nominalists or because we find that
\nwhich we\u2019ve received from the prophets so markedly different), we\u2019ll find ourselves faced
\nwith different trees, which bear different fruits. And these fruits have different qualities and
\neffects; one is sweet like the date, another is sour like the currant, one is crisp like the
\napple, another is soft like the mulberry. Of course, this implies that they have shared
\nqualities as well. If you look at them in an a posteriori fashion, you may discover that they all
\ncontain a certain amount of fructose or water. Nonetheless, they are different and it is not as
\nif the currant is the advanced form of the date, or the date, the perfected form of the currant.
\nWe cannot classify them in this way, but they are all beneficial and useful.
\nIn this way, plurality is the norm in this world. It\u2019s very strange for us to be proceeding
\non the assumption of unity, determined to crush the pluralities. That is to say, if you believe
\nin the principality of quiddity (as many of our philosophers have done) or if you believe in
\nnominalism (and many theologians, especially the Ash\u2019ari theologians, have done) essential
\nplurality is the order of the day in the world, with unity representing only a thin veneer over
\nthe pluralities. The world is filled with different things and different species. This is
\nincontestable. There\u2019s nothing wrong with acknowledging this same plurality of \u00ab species\u00bb in
\nthe world of religion; especially when it comes to religious experiences and prophetic
\nrevelations. Why must we rule out this plurality of species or why make it so emaciated as to
\nhave it dissolve into unity? Plurality is clearly the norm in the real world: the plurality of
\nnatural forces, the plurality of things and species, the plurality of experiences. And, although
\nthey have common characteristics, their plurality (whether in nominalist terms or because of
\nthe principality of their quiddity), is irreducible to unity.
\nQ. Can we arrive at a well-argued preference for one of these experiences? In<\/strong>
\nother words, can we find a justification for saying that this experience is superior to<\/strong>
\nand more profound than all the others?<\/strong>
\nA. If we subscribe to the idea of the plurality of kinds, there\u2019s little room for this type of
\nargument. Let me give you a simple example. One of the best display cases for the
\nessential plurality of experience is the world of arts and letters. You have the experience of
\nSa\u2019di\u2019s poetry, you have the experience of Hafez\u2019s poetry, you have Khaqani, Nezami,
\nMowlavi and others to the present day and all the contemporary poets. The works of all
\nthese masters are similar in terms of being products of the imagination, creative works and
\nso on (this is the generic similarity). Nonetheless, there can be almost no question of saying
\nthat one of them is superior to the others or the perfected form of all the rest. In other words,
\nyou are sincerely faced with a true plurality, such that each poem and each poet is a kind
\nunto themselves, despite certain similarities. The whole thing becomes more evident still if
\nyou widen your scope and go beyond Persian literature to embrace other languages. I
\nbelieve that one of the best arenas for seeing and tasting plurality par excellence, as
\ndifferences in kind, is the world of the arts and letters. And this world of inspiration is not that
\ndissimilar from the world of religious experience; creativity flows through both of them and
\nthe poet or the prophet is both the mover and the moved, both the receptacle and the
\ncreator. And this goes back to the nature of these people who are undergoing the
\nexperience and the fact that they are different \u00ab species \u00bb, with none of them necessarily
\nbeing a more excellent version of any other, such that it would be impossible to arrange them
\nin a linear form. This is the way I see it.
\nQ. So, at any rate, we go as far as we can with our arguments about what is<\/strong>
\nsuperior or inferior until we reach the point where we are virtually faced with several<\/strong>
\nalternatives of equal standing which defy ordering. Is that right?<\/strong>
\nA. In fact, our arguments or reasoning direct us until we arrive at kinds. When you
\narrive at this point, you are faced with \u00ab species\u00bb; that is, actually existing plurality. Here,
\nvarious attractive attributes come into play. You may be attracted to and enchanted by the
\npoetry of Hafez. I may feel the same way about Mowlavi, but be unable to prove that
\nMowlavi is superior to Hafez or demonstrate why I was enchanted by Mowlavi, whereas you
\nwere enchanted by Hafez. This plurality is the end of the line. You cannot transform this
\nplurality into unity. It is irreducible. Reasons lead us to \u00ab species\u00bb and species are
\nirreducibly plural.
\nQ. We have to arrive at the realisation that they are species by a process of<\/strong>
\nargumentation and reasoning and so on. In other words, we have to reach the point<\/strong>
\nwhere something is irreducible and then decide that we are faced with a \u00abspecies \u00bb.<\/strong>
\nA. That\u2019s right. But we also refer to our philosophical foundations. We always
\nreason within a framework. When you engage in reasoning you are either a nominalist or a
\nrealist. Your framework governs the process. In fact, this is another pluralism. Ultimately,
\nthe question of whether to operate within the discipline of realism or not is itself a choice. In
\nother words, at this basic level, too, we\u2019re faced with two kinds of discipline, not two degrees.
\nThe issue of the prevalence and principality of \u00ab plurality \u00bb is truly worthy of reflection. I think
\nthat a completely unjustified tendency to favour a unified approach to thinking governs many
\nminds. These people want to crush the pluralities at any price and dissolve them into unity.
\nIt is as if some people find the word \u00ab unity \u00bb more beautiful and when they speak about
\nplurality, they start thinking about chaos and dissension and disorder; whereas the real
\nworld is a world of plurality.
\nQ. It might be a good idea now to discuss another one of your assumptions in<\/strong>
\nyour treatment of pluralism, the question of \u00ab salvation \u00bb and \u00ab being rightly guided \u00bb<\/strong>
\nand its relationship to the truth. Are you of the opinion that \u00ab being rightly guided\u00bb<\/strong>
\nstands in some kind of necessary relationship to \u00ab being right \u00bb or \u00ab correspondence<\/strong>
\nto the truth\u00bb, or is it the case that, if someone is sincere in their actions, this sincerity<\/strong>
\nwill necessarily guide them and lead them to salvation?<\/strong>
\nA. We have already spoken about the question of truth in the realm of religion and
\nwe stressed and insisted on the point that the truth and falsehood of religions is conditional
\nand follows the indexical model. It is, therefore, possible to have several religions, all of
\nwhich may be true, existing alongside one another. And they will direct their followers to the
\ntruth and, hence, to salvation. The people who criticise or reject this idea seem to find it
\nunbearable to imagine that there could be any truth other than the truth that they like or
\naccept; everything else must therefore be false. And since there is a relationship between
\nbeing rightly guided and the truth, they do not believe that anyone outside their own religion
\ncan be rightly guided. But, on the basis of what we have said, several religions may all be
\ntrue and their followers may be rightly guided and saved (and not excused).
\nSecondly, we must see what \u00ab being rightly guided \u00bb and \u00abbeing saved \u00bb imply.
\nLook, we can proceed here on the basis of several premises and assumptions. One is that,
\nwhen we speak about \u00ab guidance \u00bb and \u00ab salvation \u00bb, we are mainly speaking about otherworldly
\nsalvation. In other words, we\u2019re not just thinking about this world. Now, let us
\nassume that the exclusivists are right and there is only one truth. If an individual has not
\nfound this single truth in this world but proceeds on the basis of sincerity (within the limits of
\ntheir capacities and understanding), what could possibly be wrong with saying that this
\nindividual will find the truth in the hereafter and attain salvation? Why must we make it a
\ncondition of salvation that you arrive at the truth in this world? Why must we imagine that
\nanyone who failed to arrive at the truth (as we understand it) in this world will fail to arrive at
\nthe truth – and, therefore, salvation – in the other world too and can only end up in hell?! The
\nholy verse that says \u00ab But those who were blind in this world will be blind in the Hereafter,
\nand most astray from the Path \u00bb is speaking about the blind, not about those who can see
\nbut who\u2019ve failed to see some truths. These people are not barred from seeing the truth in
\nthe hereafter; hence, they too may be seen as taking the path of rightful guidance. In brief, if
\nbeing rightly guided means following the path to the truth, this path may arrive at the desired
\nend both in this world and in the other; ultimately leading the follower to the truth.
\nQ. What if they lack sincerity? Will they still arrive at the truth?<\/strong>
\nA. Yes. But he who lacks sincerity will suffer the consequences of his insincerity. As
\nMowlavi puts it, human beings have been created to bow down before the truth; however,
\nsome people are good and fall down without being compelled, whereas others must first
\nexperience despair before bowing down. Mowlavi says that, on this basis, hell, too, is a
\nplace of worship, but a place of worship for the wicked; in other words, they will bow down
\nover there.
\nYes, the discovery of the truth comes through a removal of the veils and, according to
\nreligious teachings, sometimes this is accompanied by hardship, torment and suffering, and,
\nat other times, not; sometimes it occurs in this world and, at other times, in the other world.
\nThe rightly guided is not only the one who arrives at the truth in this world painlessly. The
\nperson who arrives at the truth in the other world painlessly is also rightly guided and all the
\neffects of being rightly guided will accrue to them, that is, salvation, deliverance and felicity.
\nArriving at the truth must not be confined to the time a person spends in this world. The road
\nremains open. And, according to religious teachings, the individual has eternal life and may
\narrive at the truth after death.
\nHence, sincerity and purity in life does not stand against the attainment of the truth; it
\ncan serve as a prelude and preparation. Some of the critics have said (from an exclusivist
\nposition) that, if a well-intentioned person does not arrive at the truth in this world, they will
\nbe \u00ab excused \u00bb and saved in the other world but they are not \u00ab rightly guided \u00bb. The
\n\u00ab excused \u00bb seems to be their way of excusing God. In other words, they are trying to say
\nthat, if God\u2019s guidance did not reach this individual, he will not receive God\u2019s torment either;
\nso there is no need to quibble with God over this. Nonetheless, as I said, remarks of this
\nkind are unjustified. They are all spoken from an exclusivist position. But, from a pluralist
\nposition, there are different truths and they all entail rightful guidance and, hence, felicity.
\nOn this basis, most people must be considered to be rightly guided. They constitute different
\nkinds and different degrees of guidance and they are all human. We cannot define guidance
\nas something that is beyond human capacity. It is exactly like \u00ab rationality \u00bb. People are
\nrational to different degrees and they are all rational in the same sense. It is much the same
\nwith rightful guidance.
\nWhen the gentlemen say, it may be that most people will be saved on judgement day
\nbut they are not rightly guided, this is incorrect. Because we have to ask, why are they
\nsaved? After all, they must have some attribute that allows them to be saved. Any share in
\nsalvation implies a share in rightful guidance. In other words, it is their qualities and assets
\nthat prevents them from ending up in hell; apart from the attackers of the truth who, in Ibn
\nSina\u2019s view, are a minority.
\nSome of my critics are of the view that all non-Shi\u2019is will end up in hell. But those who
\ntake a step further and say that any well-intentioned non-Shi\u2019i is \u00ab saved \u00bb must then make it
\nclear why these people are saved. If going to heaven and being saved from torment
\ndemands belief in the truth, these people shouldn\u2019t be saved either. Hence, the words of
\nthose who say all non-Shi\u2019is will end up in hell would appear to be more accurate!
\nQ. We could say that they will be saved because they do not show ill will<\/strong>
\ntowards the truth and, if they were to see the truth, they would accept it. They now<\/strong>
\nthink that they have arrived at the truth, but if they realise that the truth lies elsewhere,<\/strong>
\nthey will turn to it. And this absence of ill will towards the truth can itself be seen as<\/strong>
\nrightful guidance. In other words, we can take guidance to mean a willingness to<\/strong>
\naccept the truth and an absence of ill will towards it.<\/strong>
\nA. Yes. It is no mean guidance for a person to be willing to accept the truth and to
\nhave no inherent obstinacy against it. We are gradually being guided to the right definition of
\n\u00ab rightful guidance \u00bb. So far we were looking at guidance with our eyes firmly on the
\ndestination, whereas guidance is about the road, not the destination. Hence, we shouldn\u2019t
\nbe saying that only those who have reached the destination (in the sense of definitely true
\nbeliefs) are rightly guided, but that anyone who has stepped onto the path of truth has a
\nshare of rightful guidance. It is amazing that we all read for ourselves and ask God to guide
\nus to the \u00ab right path \u00bb, yet we still forget that guidance is about the path and not a series of
\ncomplete ideas lodged in our brains. The Koran specifically contrasts one who follows \u00ab vain
\ndesire \u00bb with the rightly guided and says: \u00ab Then seest thou such a one as takes as his god
\nhis own vain desire? God has, knowing (him as such), left him astray, and sealed his hearing
\nand his heart (and understanding), and put a cover on his sight; who then, will guide him
\nafter God (has withdrawn Guidance)? \u00bb Hence, we have two roads: the road of vain desire
\nand the baser instincts and the road of guidance, and anyone who doesn\u2019t, in thought and in
\ndeed, follow their baser instincts is on the road of guidance. End of story. And this is the
\nvery road that will, sooner or later, in this world or in that, lead the follower to salvation. As
\nMowlavi puts it: \u00ab If the desires are rife, then faith is not\/for if faith is the gate, then the
\ndesires are the lock \u00bb.
\nThe prophets, for their part, have shown us ways of combating the desires. And
\nthose who have found those ways (or some of them) without the prophets are definitely
\nrightly guided, because the personality of the prophets isn\u2019t what\u2019s relevant here. The
\nrelevant point is their teachings. Regardless of how anyone finds their way to these
\nteachings it is a boon. Personalities are accidents in religion. What\u2019s essential is the
\nmessage. Of course, in practice and in the real world, most people need a prophet and
\ncannot find the path to rightful guidance unaided. And even if they do, in the opinion of some
\nmystics, they only manage to skirt around it.
\nQ. If pluralism holds true, then why do we preach our own religion and invite<\/strong>
\nother people to it? What would be the point of jihad, enjoining others to the good,<\/strong>
\nseeking martyrdom and so on?<\/strong>
\nA. Very well. Let\u2019s assume that pluralism doesn\u2019t hold true and we\u2019re exclusivists.
\nNonetheless, there are generous exclusivists who believe that, although others aren\u2019t rightly
\nguided, they will be saved. So I would ask them here: what\u2019s the point of inviting others to
\nour religion? What the point of jihad? What\u2019s the point of enjoining the good? After all, are
\nthese people who are going to be saved doing anything wrong? Aren\u2019t they going to be
\nspared the torments of hell? The most that you can say is that we are inviting them to
\nsomething better. But then there\u2019d be no obligation to do so. It would be a good deed but
\nthere\u2019d be no blame attached if you chose not to do it.
\nHence, whether you\u2019re exclusivists who believe that others will also be saved or
\npluralists who believe both that others will be saved and that they are rightly guided, you
\nmust still answer these questions. But the more important point is that, those who believe
\nthat anyone who displays no ill will towards the truth will be saved are in fact acknowledging
\nthat there are a number of right paths leading to salvation, since there are many different
\nbases on which people may be excused and saved. And this is identical to pluralism.
\nBut the straightforward answer is that anyone who, by reason and by love, is
\ncommitted to something, sees beauties in it that they do not see in other people\u2019s beliefs and
\nideas. They are, therefore, eager to present these beauties to others; in other words, the
\ncall to religion becomes a kind of \u00abpresentation\u00bb; that\u2019s all. Just like an artist who puts his
\ncanvasses on display. If we say that pluralism holds sway in the world of arts and letters
\n(which it does), does that mean that Sa\u2019di and Hafez mustn\u2019t present their poetry and put it at
\nthe disposal of others? Everyone wishes to adore and be adored. Some people are more
\ndisposed to being adored and others, to adoring. Let the world of loving and being loved
\nprosper and thrive. There\u2019s much to be gained by many here. The world of religion, too, is a
\nworld of adoration and charms. And, in order to charm, a host of beauties, purities and
\npieties must be presented.
\nLet me also say again that pluralism does not imply that everything that is said is true.
\nHence, the call to religion can help expose falsehoods.
\nQ. It may also be that someone wants to find something better or to convey<\/strong>
\nand teach to others things that he is more familiar with.<\/strong>
\nA. Yes, that\u2019s right. But the prevailing interpretation seems to be that the reason for
\njihad is to wipe all bar one religion off the face of the earth and to make all the faithful believe
\nin the same thing. This kind of jihad does not fit in with pluralism. If, according to the critics,
\neven those who bear no ill will will be saved and will benefit from a minimum of salvation,
\nwhy do they have to be eliminated?
\nSome people have even said that, if we subscribe to religious pluralism, there will be
\nno certitude left that people can fight for. This is bizarre demagoguery. Don\u2019t people fight to
\nsave their livelihoods? Don\u2019t people fight and die for their homelands? Most such wars are
\ninstinctive and motivated by love. And, as it happens, their underlying assumption is
\npluralism. Everyone knows that every nation has its own homeland, that it has the right to
\ndefend its homeland, that it has the right to love its homeland more than all other homelands.
\nAnd, yet, people resist when they are attacked. In other words, despite the assumption that
\nthere are different homelands (pluralism), they sacrifice their lives for their homeland. Why
\nshouldn\u2019t it be the same in the world of religion? Aggressors have to be thwarted in any
\ncase. The answer to peace is peace, and the answer to war is war. We\u2019ll set aside for the
\ntime being the fact that pluralists also do away with the need for a range of pointless quarrels
\n– which is very laudable, but we\u2019re not concerned with consequences at the moment.
\nAs to the point that \u00ab the prophets preached their own religion and did not concern
\nthemselves with religious pluralism \u00bb, this is certainly true. But we are not prophets. This is
\nan important idea that I feel strongly about: there are many things that the Prophet did that
\nwe must not do. The Prophet said, you must hail me. But we have no right to say that
\npeople must hail us. The Prophet waged primary jihad (to convert non-Muslims to Islam).
\nBut, according to most Islamic jurists, we do not have the right to wage primary jihad. Or, for
\nexample, he married a number of times, which was his special right, not the right of his
\nfollowers. His wives didn\u2019t have the right to remarry after the Prophet had died and so on.
\nAt any rate, the Prophet had special privileges, which it would not be seemly for us to claim.
\nWhen we look at things from outside religions, if we arrive at pluralism, we must act on its
\nimplications. The Prophet came to add a religion to other religions. He carried out his task.
\nThe unintended consequence of this was that it stoked the furnace of pluralism. We\u2019re now
\nfaced with this blazing furnace, whether we\u2019re prepared to given it official recognition or not.
\nLet us recall that the appearance of the prophets was like the growth of different trees, each
\nof which bears its own fruit, with its own taste and its own benefits. They founded an
\norchard. A single tree does not an orchard make. That was their task. Now, in the words of
\nSa\u2019di, \u00ab we\u2019re the bystanders gazing upon the orchard \u00bb.
\nQ. Your model is based on conditional truth and ultimately leads to the<\/strong>
\nconclusion that human beings take precedence over ideas, not ideas over human<\/strong>
\nbeings. On this basis, people can no longer be killed for their false beliefs or forced<\/strong>
\nto change their beliefs. In other words, a line is drawn under all such deeds.<\/strong>
\nA. These are all precepts that are open to exegesis and this exegesis always takes
\nplace against the backdrop of the jurist\u2019s theological assumptions, assumptions about human
\nnature and so on. And, if a jurist really accepts pluralistic assumptions, he can interpret
\nthese precepts in a new way.
\nQ. We spoke about causal pluralism and reasoned pluralism. It may be useful<\/strong>
\nnow to speak about interpretative pluralism or textual pluralism.<\/strong>
\nA. First, if I may, I\u2019d like to add a point to our earlier discussion about \u00ab guidance \u00bb.
\nSome people have said that the fact that one of God\u2019s attributes is \u00ab the Guide \u00bb does not
\nimply that the majority of the people are rightly guided, because God has offered guidance
\nthrough the prophets. Some people decide to turn to religion and others not. So, basically, if
\nsome people remain misguided (even if they are in the majority), this is no reflection on God
\nand does not affect His position as the Guide.
\nIt must be said in response that the idea of free will and choice are being confused
\nhere. Imitators, who form the majority of believers, turn to religion by virtue of imitation, the
\ncompulsions of the environment and, so to speak, by cause. The have free will, but they do
\nnot choose, because they are not faced with a number of alternatives; and, even if they
\nwere, they do not have the capacity or the opportunity to choose. The religiosity of the
\nmasses is a dogmatic, external, causal religiosity that is not based on choice. This being the
\ncase, those who have gone astray have not done so deliberately and by choice. They have,
\nin fact, been deprived of guidance and this does clash with God\u2019s attribute of being the
\nGuide. Let us imagine that, after the Prophet had died, a handful of people distorted his
\nreligion. We can say that that handful went astray deliberately, but what about all the rest?
\nWhat sense would there be in saying that nearly all Muslims had deliberately turned away
\nfrom the truth? Can we say, for example, that nine hundred million Sunnis have seen the
\ntruth and deliberately chosen to ignore it? What sort of position is this? Is it anything other
\nthan a refusal to confront the issue?
\nThe truth of the matter is that if we accept the principle of grace (even if we reject it)
\nand if we accept God\u2019s attribute of being the Guide and if we do not confine guidance to only
\nthose beliefs that we consider true, then God\u2019s attribute has functioned as it should and
\nguidance exists throughout the world, with people all having a share of it. The majority of the
\npeople will be saved and the fact that they will be saved arises from the fact that they are
\nrightly guided. And if they do not arrive at full and complete guidance in this world, they will
\nachieve it in the hereafter. This is why one of God\u2019s names is \u00ab the Guide \u00bb . And it isn\u2019t
\nright to say that people are free to choose and, if they go astray, it\u2019s their own fault. This is
\nnot at all the case.
\nQ. Hence, we don\u2019t have anyone in the world who is not rightly guided?<\/strong>
\nA. Yes, we do. If we decide to speak about God\u2019s attributes in philosophical terms,
\nwe have to say that these attributes manifest and realise themselves in the majority of cases.
\nMinor instances do not contravene God\u2019s attribute of the Guide. It should also be said that
\n\u00ab Misleader \u00bb is also one of God\u2019s attributes and manifests itself in certain ways. However,
\nthis is a subordinate attribute and its realisation is overshadowed by God\u2019s attribute of the
\nGuide (in the opinion of the mystics).
\nNow, let\u2019s turn to interpretative pluralism. You\u2019ll undoubtedly be aware of the quarrel
\nbetween Kant and Schopenhauer. The distinguished Mr Kant believed that noumena are
\nbeyond our ken and we have no access to them. We must content ourselves with
\nphenomena and call it a day. Schopenhauer, on the other hand, argued that noumena and
\nphenomena are, after all, interrelated and it\u2019s not as if they\u2019re worlds apart and disjointed
\n(which seems to be a very reasonable thing to say). Schopenhauer was of the view that
\nnoumena are very ugly (judging by phenomena); that the real world is very ugly and
\nterrifying, in other words. This was why he believed we had to seek recourse from this ugly
\nworld in aesthetics and the arts. This is a very fundamental point. And this is how I see the
\nrelationship between science and metaphysics. Science deals with phenomena and
\nmetaphysics claims that it can deal with noumena. It believes that it can circumvent
\nmethods, go straight to the essence and nature of things, and discover the rules that govern
\nthem.
\nOn this basis, we have to say that there is and must be a relationship between
\nscience and philosophy. If science consists of formulating the rules that can be obtained
\nusing scientific methods and if philosophy consists of formulating that which is learnt by
\nconscious experience and phenomenological methods – and conveying the rules that govern
\nreality itself – then it would be impossible for these two techniques to be unrelated. There is
\na serious link between them. On the whole, there has to be a link between the for us and the
\nin itself.
\nThe conclusion I want to draw is this: if we decide that some things are antinomic –
\nthat is to say, in some instances reason really comes up against a wall and has to contend
\nwith two totally contradictory positions, such that it is impossible to come down decisively in
\nfavour of one or the other (at the level of the for us) – then we have to conclude that the
\nunderlying fact or the in itself is such that it confounds reason. We mustn\u2019t say that, when
\nthe mind falls into confusion, it is no reflection on the facts themselves. The facts that have
\ncaused the confusion must be different from other, straightforward facts.
\nNow, when we come to texts, this point is patently clear. Texts are actually and
\nintrinsically ambiguous. They are laden with different meanings. Take for example the verse
\n\u00ab They followed what the evil ones gave out (falsely) against the power of Solomon… \u00bb
\n(Bagharah, 102) The late scholar Tabataba\u2019i has written under this verse that we have one
\nmillion two hundred and sixty thousand different interpretations of it. Hence, at the level of
\nunderstanding (the for us) we are faced with a multiplicity of meanings. This is where we
\nhave to say that there is a relationship between the \u00ab in itself \u00bb and the \u00ab for us \u00bb. This
\nincredible range and variety of meanings speaks of an underlying structure that is
\nambiguous and lends itself to different meanings.
\nIn the world of texts and symbolism, we are really faced with this lack of clarity. That
\nis to say, even if we accept the judgement of philosophers about actual entities (anything
\nthat has not been detected does not exist), this is in all fairness unacceptable in the world of
\ntexts and one of the reasons is precisely what we said. The entry of metaphors, analogies
\nand the like into language was not a deliberate decision; speech itself dictated it. It\u2019s not as
\nif it was possible to speak without using figurative language and some people just took it into
\ntheir heads to introduce figurative expressions in order to widen the scope of speakers. The
\nsame goes for ambiguity. Precision and care have never obliterated the intrinsic ambiguity of
\nlanguage.
\nThe world of meaning is essentially and inherently pluralistic. You may exceptionally
\nfind an instance where there is only one meaning, but plurality is the rule. You will arrive at a
\n\u00ab correct meaning \u00bb of a text when you apply well-honed methods for understanding a text
\nwithin your capacities (methodological capacities, mental capacities, etc.), not when you
\nreach the true meaning of the text, because there is no such thing as \u00abtrue meaning \u00bb.
\nThere can be a number of correct meanings. Of course, you can speak of an inappropriate
\nmeaning, which is a meaning that does not follow from your method; nevertheless, it is not
\nnecessarily an \u00ab incorrect \u00bb meaning.
\nYes, there are structural limitations within a text which rule out some meanings. But
\nthe fact remains that a text does not necessarily have a single meaning. In the realm of
\ntexts, there is no such thing as \u00ab truth \u00bb in the sense of correspondence with the author\u2019s
\nintention. When an author uses a phrase to convey a meaning, he has understood one of its
\nmeanings and chosen it on that basis. Nonetheless, that phrase can have other meanings.
\nIf an author bears it in mind that a text can have meanings independent of the author\u2019s
\nintentions, he wouldn\u2019t easily accuse others of being misguided. Here, \u00ab guided \u00bb and
\n\u00ab misguided \u00bb themselves take on different meanings.
\nAnd when we speak about texts here, we\u2019re not just speaking about the written
\nvariety; we \u2018re referring to any system of symbols or signs which is neither of the nature of
\nreasons used to justify a claim, nor of the nature of causes used to provide an explanation;
\nthey are of the nature of symbols used in discovery and understanding. You may find this
\nsymbolism in religious experiences, in dreams, in the attributes of the Creator, in written texts
\nand so on. The discovery of a fact through symbols brings into play interpretative or
\nhermeneutic rationality. Here, we arrive not at a reasoned or caused understanding, but at
\nan interpretative understanding, which is essentially, intrinsically and inevitably pluralistic.
\nQ. It may be said that, in view of their limited capacities, human beings cannot<\/strong>
\nsucceed in making a text convey only the intended meaning. But God has absolute<\/strong>
\npower and He can ensure that a text conveys only the meaning He wishes to its<\/strong>
\nreaders. This would rule out the possibility of any textual ambiguity.<\/strong>
\nA. First of all, we can see that that\u2019s not how it\u2019s turned out in practice. If God was
\nmeant to have spoken this clearly, we wouldn\u2019t have a verse in the Koran that has one million
\ntwo hundred thousand meanings; but we do. And, if it is said that, in these cases, God
\nwanted these verses to have multiple meanings, whereas in other cases, he did not, this
\nclaim is unfalsifiable. That is to say, if its is false, we have no way of establishing it.
\nSecondly, we can reject the claim by saying that there is evil in the world and the
\nulema have themselves conceded as much and said that the occurrence of evil in the world
\nis incidental and secondary, and not essential. In their own words, this is a result of the
\nshortcomings of substance and not a sign of any weakness or oversight on the part of the
\nCreator. In other words, God has created something which has certain characteristics and
\ncompulsions. And these compulsions manifest themselves in the form of evil, flaws and
\nimperfections. The same can be said of language. In this instance, God uses a tool that is
\ninherently vague and unavoidably ambiguous, even when deployed by the Creator.
\nThe conclusion here is not that divine power has manifested some blemish but that,
\nin the words of the ulema, we are faced with a logical or rational impossibility which is
\nirresolvable. And the Creator\u2019s power does not apply to impossibilities, which are
\ninsubstantial.
\nQ. Hence, in the case of sacred texts, we have to say that there is a<\/strong>
\ncorrespondence between the text and the Author or Speaker\u2019s intention; in other<\/strong>
\nwords, the multiple meanings of the text are all the Creator\u2019s intentions.<\/strong>
\nA. Yes. That is to say, God knew the nature of the implement and substance He
\nwas wielding, and He knew that His creatures would arrive at different interpretations. We
\ntherefore have to say that they are all the Creator\u2019s intentions and, if God made it incumbent
\non people to discover His \u00ab true meaning \u00bb, it would be asking something of them that is
\nbeyond their capacity. Language by its very nature does not allow the discovery of a single
\nmeaning. To put it in philosophic terms, text has not been actualised, it is potential. And this
\npotential lends itself to many meanings.
\nQ. Apart from the process of induction, can we cite rational reasons for the<\/strong>
\nambiguity of language? In effect, the difference between you and your critics comes<\/strong>
\ndown to the point where your critics say that discovering the Speaker\u2019s intention is<\/strong>
\npossible and the Speaker has a single intention; whereas you raise the linguistic<\/strong>
\npremise that a text is intrinsically ambiguous and lends itself to different meanings.<\/strong>
\nDo you have a reason for this philosophical-linguistic premise?<\/strong>
\nA. My reason is precisely the relationship between the \u00ab in itself \u00bb and the \u00ab for us \u00bb.
\nQ. But the reason you give would appear not to be categorical. The plurality at<\/strong>
\nthe level of the for us can at most suggest that plurality at the level of the in itself<\/strong>
\ncannot be ruled out; it does not make it categorical. That is to say, if we discover<\/strong>
\nplurality at the level of the for us (understanding), one option open to us is to say that<\/strong>
\nthe plurality exists at the level of the in itself (the text); nonetheless, there is no<\/strong>
\ninherent contradiction between plurality at the level of the for us and unity at the level<\/strong>
\nof the in itself.<\/strong>
\nA. Look, we\u2019re opting for \u00ab the best explanation \u00bb for the plurality at the level of the
\nfor us or making an inference to the best explanation. We find ourselves faced with a
\nmultitude of cases where we have texts (whether human or sacred) with a host of meanings.
\nPerhaps the best guess or best inference for explaining this state of affairs is that the text is
\nitself ambiguous and lends itself to many meanings.
\nQ. Another inference would be to say that this plurality is a product of the<\/strong>
\ndifferences between the minds of the readers.<\/strong>
\nA. This would lead us to the same place. Meaning means understandable meaning.
\nDifferences between minds means differences in the accumulated information in those
\nminds. And the accumulated information in people\u2019s minds is the prerequisite and premise
\nfor the comprehension of meaning. Hence, the differences between the minds ultimately
\ngoes back to the different meanings of a text that have entered the different minds. And the
\nvery fact that different minds obtain different meanings from a text means that the text allows
\nmany meanings and that they are all appropriate to it.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In A Soroush, Seratha-yi Mostaqim, (1377\/1998) Tehran: Serat, pp137-196 Q. Since you put forward the theory of religious pluralism, there\u2019s been much debate on the subject and various people have commented on it. But understanding the theory of pluralism must surely take precedence over criticising and judging it. A brief look at the debates suggests […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"ngg_post_thumbnail":0},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/drsoroush.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73"}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/drsoroush.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/drsoroush.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/drsoroush.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/drsoroush.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=73"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"http:\/\/drsoroush.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/drsoroush.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=73"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/drsoroush.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=73"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/drsoroush.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=73"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}