An interview with Abdol Karim Soroush<\/p>\n
Q. The subject of our discussion is \u00ab religious faith \u00bb. If I may, I\u2019d like to begin by<\/strong> Q. If you agree with the division of religion into the three above-mentioned<\/strong> Q. It seems that, throughout history, religious experiences have always<\/strong> Q. What I was trying to say is that it would seem that certain preconditions are<\/strong> Q. It would seem that a theory about faith that sees religious experience as the<\/strong> Q. Given the fact that new rationality is probing and critical, what\u2019s the<\/strong> Q. Might there not be concern that, in circumstances in which we are moving<\/strong> Q. If these misgivings arise, can the believer still maintain their trust,<\/strong> Q. As you know, rational divinities have faced serious and profound crises<\/strong> Q. As you said, there may be ups and downs in the religious life of gnostic<\/strong> Q. Has this dramatic qualitative and quantitative decline in religious experience<\/strong> Q. It would seem that the ideas raised in your analysis point in a different<\/strong> Q. The problem is that faith is one thing and gnosticism another. Faith, as you<\/strong> Q. What\u2019s your own assessment?<\/strong> Q. If we accept that religious beliefs make it possible for the believer and the<\/strong> Q. What specific, practical proposals do you have for strengthening<\/strong> Q. Don\u2019t you think that these recommendations were meaningful and effective<\/strong> Q. Pragmatic or utilitarian religiosity itself has aspects that are knowledgebound;<\/strong> Q. You said in reply to previous questions that religious beliefs are like faces<\/strong> Q. In the history of religion and in the history of Islam, in particular, the<\/strong> Q. You\u2019ve drawn a distinction between the face and the faceless, or between<\/strong> Translated by Nilou Mobasser<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" An interview with Abdol Karim Soroush Q. The subject of our discussion is \u00ab religious faith \u00bb. If I may, I\u2019d like to begin by asking you, what\u2019s your understanding and definition of religious faith? If we take religion to be composed of the three elements of religious experiences, religious beliefs and religious practices, what\u2019s […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"ngg_post_thumbnail":0},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/drsoroush.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/78"}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/drsoroush.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/drsoroush.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/drsoroush.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/drsoroush.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=78"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"http:\/\/drsoroush.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/78\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/drsoroush.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=78"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/drsoroush.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=78"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/drsoroush.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=78"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
\nasking you, what\u2019s your understanding and definition of religious faith? If we take<\/strong>
\nreligion to be composed of the three elements of religious experiences, religious<\/strong>
\nbeliefs and religious practices, what\u2019s the relationship between religious faith and<\/strong>
\nthese three elements?<\/strong>
\nA. Religious faith, as I understand it, consists of believing in and becoming attached
\nto someone, as well as trusting them, thinking well of them and loving them. In saying this,
\nI\u2019ve mainly defined faith in God, because God is the central axis of monotheistic belief
\nsystems. Faith cannot be equated with belief per se; not every instance of belief – even
\ndogmatic belief – can be seen as an instance of faith, because in faith you not only have
\nbelief, but you also have trust, commitment, devotion, love, humility and submissiveness.
\nWe have many beliefs which, while being matters of total conviction, are not described as
\nmatters of faith. For example, on the basis of our religious teachings, we have total
\nconviction in the existence of Satan. But we certainly do not have faith in Satan, because we
\ndo not consider him worthy of our trust, we do not become devoted to him and we see no
\nvirtue in him.
\nThe same can be said of everything that falls under the rubric of science and
\nphilosophy. It would be difficult to say that philosophers have faith in the veracity of
\nexistence or in the principle of causality. Or that scientists have faith in atomic theory. The
\nreason for this does not lie in any lack of certainty or conviction in these ideas; it is just that
\nother requirements and conditions must be met, alongside belief, for us to be able to use the
\nword \u00ab faith \u00bb in any meaningful sense.
\nWhen religious faith – in the sense and with the conditions I have set out here –
\ncomes about in someone\u2019s mind or heart, there\u2019s a complete transformation in their entire
\nexistence. This transformation in one\u2019s very being is different from any transformation that
\nmay occur simply in one\u2019s mind. A believer hands over their entire being to their faith. And,
\nas certain philosophers have said, faith gives a person a whole new life; it doesn\u2019t just plant a
\nnew piece of data in their minds. This devout existence is the very opposite of an irreligious
\nexistence. An irreligious being is essentially bent on rejection, disobedience and denial,
\nwhereas a devout being is brimming with humility and surrender. If we turn to religious texts,
\nwe find evidence corroborating this interpretation. There is a verse in the Koran, for
\nexample, that states: \u00ab For, believers are those who, when Allah is mentioned, feel a tremor
\nin their hearts, and when they hear His Signs rehearsed, find their faith strengthened, and
\nput all their trust in their Lord. \u00bb (Anfal, 2) The tremor in the heart is a sign of humility and
\nsurrender, and it is an indication of the relationship of love and submissiveness between the
\nbeliever and the object of faith. It is also clear that trust is one of the other attributes of the
\nbeliever and, without entrusting oneself, a believer\u2019s faith is incomplete, such that the
\ningredient of trust in the definition of faith must be seen as an analytical ingredient, not as a
\nnecessary or accidental descriptive one. Or take the following verse: \u00ab Only those believe in
\nOur Signs who, when they are recited to them, fall down in adoration, and celebrate the
\npraises of their Lord, nor are they ever puffed up with pride. Their limbs do forsake their
\nbeds of sleep, the while they call on their Lord in Fear and Hope…. \u00bb (Sajda, 15 and 16)
\nHere, falling down in adoration, humility, hope and trust have been depicted as indications of
\nfaith.
\nFaith, as I have described it, admits of degree, just as love can grow and grow and
\njust as trust and commitment and devotion may abate or intensify. The discovery of the
\nobject of faith\u2019s merits and goodness and beauty and majesty is a gradual process and can,
\ntherefore, strengthen a person\u2019s faith. In this way, the believer may grow more robust or
\nmore lean in terms of faith, just as an irreligious person can be afflicted with corpulence or
\nleanness.
\nI have deliberately not referred to certitude or unquestioning belief, because including
\ncertitude in the definition of faith is problematic and suspect. Some Muslim thinkers have
\ndefined faith as dogmatic and unquestioning belief. And when they\u2019ve encountered the idea
\nthat faith admits of degree (something that is explicitly stated in the Koran), they\u2019ve run into
\ndifficulties and tried to explain it as relating to the symptoms of faith, not its essence. Of
\ncourse, certitude does not admit of degree, but faith does, and this is reason to believe that
\nfaith and certitude are not one and the same. In faith, there must be a degree of conviction.
\nAs long as a person is more convinced about something or someone\u2019s existence and
\ngoodness – rather than their non-existence – and, as long as, on this basis the person takes a
\nrisk and grows fond of that being and dares to hope and, sensing a certain amount of
\nsuccess, finds their hope and trust and conviction fortified and embarks on even greater
\nhopes and risks and sacrifices, this person can be described as a believer. Here, the
\nelements of risking and hoping and entrusting oneself gain higher marks than certitude and
\nabsolute conviction.
\nThe terms hope, doubt, longing, trust… have been used so often in the Koran in
\nconnection with faith as to lend credence to the idea that, as far as the Koran is concerned,
\nfaith is comprised of these components and ingredients. Hence certitude must move in their
\ndirection, not they in the direction of certitude. That is to say, certitude must be defined with
\nreference to them, not they with reference to certitude.
\nIn the history of Christianity, for its part, the role played by certainty in faith is so
\nnegative that a great thinker like Thomas Aquinas basically saw uncertainty as the very
\nterrain and bedrock of faith. He said that, if there is indisputable evidence demonstrating the
\nveracity of something then certitude will inevitably and passively be attained in its regard, and
\nthere\u2019ll be no room for \u00ab faith as a verb\u00bb. It is the paucity of corroborating evidence that
\ncreates space for faith and risk and hope. In Protestantism and for Luther, too, trust plays a
\nbigger part in faith than certainty and conviction. Research by Cantwel Smith, the
\ncontemporary Canadian religious theorist, also shows that, for Christians in the early
\ncenturies, faith tended to convey a sense of trust, rather than certitude and absolute
\nconviction. (See R. Swinburne: Faith and Reason; E. Gilson: Reason & Revelation in the
\nMiddle Ages; and the article \u00ab Renewing Faith \u00bb in A. Soroush: Expansion of Prophetic
\nExperience) It should be pointed out that the argument here is that faith does not begin with
\ncertainty and is not necessarily based on it; it is not being suggested that faith is
\nincompatible with certainty or cannot lead to it. In brief, the fact that faith is active (as
\nopposed to the passivity of certainty) and the fact that it admits of degree (as opposed to the
\nimmutability of certainty) means that the two move along different paths.
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n
\nelements, what, in your view, is the relationship between faith and these three<\/strong>
\nelements?<\/strong>
\nA. I believe that religious experience is both the cause of and the reason for faith. If
\nyou don\u2019t like the word experience – I\u2019ve noticed that some people don\u2019t like the word
\n\u00ab experience \u00bb used in this context – we can use the word \u00ab discovery \u00bb. In any religious
\nexperience or discovery, a being, a truth or a secret appears to the discoverer. This secret
\nor truth is on occasion so beautiful, enchanting, glorious and majestic as to engulf the
\ndiscoverer\u2019s entire being and make them fall under its spell. An occurrence of this kind
\nproduces most of the characteristics we attributed to faith, such as belief, trust, commitment,
\ndevotion, humility and submissiveness, and transforms the person into a believer. This faith
\nis unwilled and lacks the element of risk; it only exists in the state of enchantment. When
\nthe person comes to and begins to think about the experience, then the element of risk
\ncomes into play and, in the midst of attachments and temptations, they must choose their
\npath and rely on their experience. It is at this point that faith is born as a \u00ab verb \u00bb and it
\nconsists of a mixture of knowledge, will, love and hope.
\nReligious beliefs formulate religious experiences and religious discoveries into
\ntheories. In fact, the relationship between religious beliefs and religious experiences is the
\nrelationship established by philosophers between acquired knowledge and immediate
\nknowledge. Immediate knowledge consists of naked and unmediated pieces of information
\nwhich have not yet been covered up with theoretical garments. We may even describe
\nimmediate knowledge as knowledge combined with oblivion, that is to say, a kind of
\nunconscious or oblivious knowledge. But when the mind begins to formulate things,
\nimmediate information is transformed into acquired information; in other words, those
\ndiscoveries are formulated into concepts and turned into propositions and perceptions,
\npropositions and perceptions that are objective and public and can be presented to others
\nand to the scientific community. These perceptions and propositions are non-personal,
\ncultural and contemporaneous, that is to say, they are entirely in keeping with the
\ndiscoverer\u2019s culture.
\nReligious practice, for its part, abates and intensifies along with the abatement and
\nintensification of faith. In other words, religious faith produces the will to action. When faith
\nis stronger, the will to action is correspondingly stronger. A number of contemporary
\nanalytical philosophers, and even some past thinkers, have considered action to be an
\nanalytic ingredient of belief, such that inaction for them implies lack of belief. This is a
\nsubject that has a long history in religious debates.
\nAs a simple example, take Ghazzali. Ghazzali was someone whose very existence
\nwas intertwined with the fear of God. This fear was not just something that he had
\nexperienced once; it had engulfed his whole being, such that, if we were to create a
\ncategory and description for Ghazzali, we would have to describe him as a fearful mystic.
\nThe fear that permeated Ghazzali\u2019s existence also dictated his actions. In the first instance,
\nhe experienced a terrifying God. Then he placed his faith in Him. And later still, he
\nproduced a theory in keeping with this fearsome God and presented it in various forms in his
\nwritings. His belief in this terrifying God also affected his deeds and, when a God of this
\nnature had appeared to him, he abandoned the life of joy. He fled from Baghdad to
\nDamascus and became a recluse there. Even on his return to Tous, when Sultan Sanjar and
\nthe military commanders invited him to resume his teaching post at the academy, he
\ndeclined, saying he had made a pact with God and did not wish to break it. This was the
\nnature of Ghazzali\u2019s religious experience and faith. As to the experience and faith of the
\nProphet, peace be upon him, it is clear for all to see. It all began in the cave of Hira and his
\nexperience in that cave became the basis of all his subsequent thoughts and deeds.
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n
\noccurred against a backdrop of religious beliefs and faith. In this sense and at a<\/strong>
\ndifferent level, does religious experience itself not follow from religious faith or<\/strong>
\nreligious belief? Is it possible for someone who has no religious faith or religious<\/strong>
\nbelief to have a religious experience?<\/strong>
\nA. Along with faith, an individual will always also acquire an image and form of the
\nobject of faith; there is no escaping this. In this sense, I agree that the two things are
\nintertwined. Nonetheless, I don\u2019t think that they are one and the same. The substance of
\nreligious beliefs is provided by experience; its form by the culture of the age and the
\ndiscoverer\u2019s imagination; and faith by will, love and hope.
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n
\nneeded for having a religious experience and that one of these preconditions is that a<\/strong>
\nperson has to have been raised in a religious tradition. Doesn\u2019t this create a situation<\/strong>
\nin which you don\u2019t know which comes first, a religious belief or a religious<\/strong>
\nexperience?<\/strong>
\nA. There can be no doubt that religious environments are conducive and
\npredisposed to religious experiences and beliefs, and that they give a sense and form to
\nreligious discoveries and lend them theoretical substance. There can also be no doubt that
\nreligion and religious theories have tended to be cumulative; that is to say, subsequent
\nexperiences have sat atop previous experiences, completing one another and growing, in a
\nsense. But to suggest that the first experience must itself have come about in a religious
\nculture, this is much more dubious. Here, cause and effect are so intertwined as to make it
\ndifficult to disentangle them. As W.T. Stace has shown in his book Mysticism and
\nPhilosophy, the religious experiences of mystics throughout history and within a variety of
\ncultures have been so similar and have had so many common features as to make it
\npossible to say that religious experiences occur independently of religious cultures.
\nHowever, when they are recounted and presented to others, they are expressed in terms of
\nthe prevailing religious concepts and culture. We must not forget something that Mowlavi
\ntells us repeatedly: in a religious experience, the person involved has a faceless experience
\nand then they put a face on it. Hence, the naked experience is always covered up by some
\ngarment and the garment is cut and sewn from the available material. This material varies
\nfrom age to age. Hence the garment is different in every age.
\nNow, we might raise the question as to whether any of these faces are more in
\nkeeping with that faceless entity? Or is it the case that all faces have an equal relationship
\nto it? This is a point that needs to be taken into account in discussing the relationship
\nbetween religious experience and religious belief: can the different sacred and theological
\nsystems based on religious experience claim to be closer to that formless core or not?
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n
\nbegetter and creator of faith must be an elitist theory. Since, if we take religious<\/strong>
\nexperience, in the technical sense of the word, to mean an encounter with God and if<\/strong>
\nwe accept that very few people have such a profound experience, we would have to<\/strong>
\nconclude that many of the people who are described as believers in religious<\/strong>
\ntraditions actually lack faith because they\u2019ve never had a religious experience.<\/strong>
\nA. I\u2019ve been speaking about quintessential religious faith; faith as an ideal type or in
\nits purest form. This was all in the nature of a proof, not a demonstration; definition, not
\nrealisation. But as you know, we rarely encounter anything in its purest form in our lives.
\nFor example, if we were to define quintessential water it would be one thing; real water,
\nanother. Quintessential water is neither hot, nor cold; neither salty, nor muddy… But the
\nwater that exists in jugs and brooks and oceans tends to have a combination of these
\nqualities.
\nWhen we speak about faith in relation to the bulk of the people, we have in mind the
\naffection, belief and hope that I mentioned, which can result from personal experience,
\ninculcation, habit, education, upbringing or anything else. The fact of the matter is that
\nreligions themselves recognise and allow this kind of faith. And we certainly have no wish to
\ndisallow it. But if these faint, diluted faiths cannot draw strength from pure, concentrated
\nfaiths, they\u2019ll be unsteady and transient. Pure religious faith and experience is what prophets
\nhave. Their faith has reasons as well as causes. But the faith of the bulk of the people is
\nusually caused not reasoned; passive, not active; determined, not willed; unconscious, not
\nconscious.
\nThe faith of believers in general is mediated. That is to say, they have no direct
\nexperience of God and they are unlikely to encounter Him. But since they trust the Prophet,
\nthey find God in this way, through him. And, in the course of their lives, if some of their
\nprayers are answered or if they have some genuine visions, their faith may become more
\nintense; otherwise, not. This is why, in my discussions on prophethood, I\u2019ve emphasised
\nthe point that, in monotheistic religions, the prophet is a key, invaluable factor. And most
\nbelievers first place their faith in their prophet and find God in this way and make Him the
\nobject of their faith.
\nAt any rate, whether it is the prophetic experience or an individual\u2019s religious
\nexperience, a necessary condition (not a sufficient condition) is the birth of a phenomenon
\nknown as faith in history and in the general culture of humanity. Then, it is necessary to
\nhave a will to action and hope, so that the leap of faith is made possible. Today, we tend to
\nsay that someone has faith if they display the general qualities and effects brought about by
\na faith-giving experience; qualities such as belief, humility, devotion, submissiveness,
\nsurrender, trust and the like. They cannot be said to have logical certitude, but they have
\nfaith. And their faith is acceptable to religious leaders. The fact that you see that sowing
\ndoubt is discouraged in religion and that there are even some harsh precepts against
\napostates and heretics shows that the Legislator knew that believers\u2019 convictions are
\nunsteady and may be shaken; they are nonetheless described as believers, because they
\ndisplay trust, humility and devotion towards the object of faith, and these are qualities that
\nfollow from faith.
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n
\nrelationship between religious faith and doubt and criticism? And what\u2019s the<\/strong>
\ndifference between having doubts and being a sceptic or a relativist?<\/strong>
\nA. I believe that the most important criticism that can be directed at the
\nphysiognomies that arise from religious experiences has to do with whether a physiognomy
\nis in keeping with the experience. This kind of criticism is, of course, different from any
\nscientific or philosophical criticism that would concern itself with those physiognomies
\nthemselves and their relationship to one another.
\nThis is one meaning of the veracity of religious beliefs: harmony and accord between
\na person\u2019s religious beliefs and the views and theories that exist in the other fields of human
\nknowledge and discovery. The truth table approach tells us that, wherever they may be,
\ntruths must be in accord. This is one type of criticism. Hence, one of the duties of a pious
\nperson or theologian is to establish accord between their religious findings and other human
\nfindings.
\nAnother meaning of veracity, which is \u00ab correspondence to reality \u00bb, guides us
\ntowards another path to criticism. That is to say, if we believe that religious theories are, in
\nreality, garments thrown over naked experiences, the question needs to be asked as to
\nwhether these garments are well-fitting or not? Answering this question is, in my view,
\nextremely difficult. And this makes it all the more imperative to investigate and criticise. The
\nperson who has had the experience must constantly ask themselves: is this theoretical
\nphysiognomy in keeping with what I experienced or not? Here, the question I raised earlier
\ncomes into its own: can it be said that some of the faces we lend to a faceless entity are
\nmore appropriate to it than others? Does an utterly faceless entity not stand in exactly the
\nsame relationship to any face? If we accept that all physiognomies are equally similar or
\ndissimilar to that faceless entity and that all theories are, in a sense, equally valid, then the
\nway will be open to theological pluralism and pluralistic belief.
\nIn any event, I believe that the door is never closed to the criticism of religious beliefs
\nand experiences, and both the person who has had the experience and the people who hear
\nand learn about it must never lay down the flag of criticism. If we accept that, at least at the
\nlevel of expression and presentation, experiences always draw on the existing reservoir of
\nperceptions and propositions, then we must constantly review, elucidate and clarify this
\nreservoir in order to refine those faces and beliefs. Hence, the criticism of religious
\nexperiences and beliefs is always oriented towards the removal of the outer garments and
\nlayers in order to move closer to the pure essence of religious experience and belief. Of
\ncourse, this kind of criticism robs us of mundane faith. But why should we worry about that?
\nIf we come to the conclusion that faith is something that is attained gradually and that it can
\nabate and intensify and be refined and purified, then we won\u2019t see any contradiction between
\nthe essence of faith and the examination of faith. There is no conceptual or actual
\nincongruity between faith and belief, on the one hand, and change and criticism, on the
\nother. What logic and definition rule out is criticism and change with respect to certitude, but
\ncertitude is not an ingredient of faith and belief.
\nA person who has a religious experience is a sculptor who is never satisfied with the
\nface he sculpts. He\u2019s constantly chipping away at it, remoulding it and shaping it into a new
\nface.
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n
\never further away in time from the Prophet\u2019s faith-giving experience, this constant<\/strong>
\nprocess of doubt and rational criticism may pose serious threats to the very<\/strong>
\nfoundation of faith? From another perspective, wouldn\u2019t this constant probing and<\/strong>
\ncriticism disturb the believer\u2019s mental and psychological stability and calm? In fact,<\/strong>
\nwe seem to be facing conditions in which having faith and remaining a believer are<\/strong>
\nincreasingly difficult.<\/strong>
\nA. In the article \u00ab Types of Religiosity \u00bb, published in Kiyan (No 50), I was in fact
\ntrying to answer these types of questions. The truth of the matter is, we have to differentiate
\nbetween different kinds of religiosity. In the faith of the bulk of the people, there\u2019s no place
\nfor whys and wherefores. This kind of faith will become more fragile if subjected to
\nquestions and criticism and will ultimately fall into decline. This is why, in the realm of
\ncollective religiosity, religion turns into a half-congealed, half-dogmatic ritual. Throughout the
\ncourse of history, the general mass of believers have followed this kind of religion and faith.
\nBut we have two other types of religiosity as well: gnostic religiosity and experiential
\nreligiosity. Gnostic religiosity basically came into being through questioning and it thrives on
\nquestioning. Pragmatic (or utilitarian) religiosity did not come into being on the basis of
\nquestioning, but on the basis of imitation, so it thrives on imitation and its survival depends
\non imitation. If ever confronted with questioning and criticism, it would melt like snow. But
\nhow can gnostic religiosity ever call a halt to questioning given that it was founded on this
\nvery basis? No-one can claim that there is only one type of religiosity: the imitative,
\npragmatic, ritualistic, mythical religiosity of the general masses. We must also accord official
\nrecognition to gnostic religiosity. On the testimony of history and the testimony of the field of
\ntheology (which has consistently existed among the followers of all religions), as well as on
\nthe testimony of the human mind (which is essentially given to rationality and inquiry and
\ncannot be banned from posing questions), gnostic religiosity has existed and will continue to
\nexist. Hence, if we accept that there is a type of religiosity that begins with criticism and
\nquestions, we cannot construct a barrier halfway down its path and ask the gnostic believer
\nto proceed no further. We therefore have to recognise that there is also a probing type of
\nfaith as well as an imitative type. This probing faith will find and has found its own way.
\nWe\u2019ve had many examples of theologians, scholars and philosophers who, while persisting
\nin their faith, were engaged in a permanent process of refining their beliefs and looking for
\npossible errors. And, although there were times when they experienced serious misgivings
\nand doubts, since these misgivings arose from faith, we see this as the virtue of faith.
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n
\ncommitment and devotion?<\/strong>
\nA. The individual is terrified by such misgivings because they\u2019re afraid of losing their
\ntrust, commitment and devotion. Hence these fears and concerns are the fears and
\nconcerns of the faithful. It\u2019s like a problem arising between you and your friend. When this
\nhappens, you can do one of two things: one, you can use it as an excuse to break off your
\nfriendship; two, you can use it as an excuse to ensure that you don\u2019t lose them and do your
\nutmost to preserve the friendship. In exactly the same way, as long as the urge to preserve
\nfaith, commitment and trust is there, it has to be seen as a misgiving within faith, a misgiving
\nwhich implies no lack of faith, which is, on the contrary, identical to faith and an example of
\nthe risk of faith. As Mowlana put it: \u00ab I tremble over my faith like a mother over her child. \u00bb
\nIn this light, the weakness and strength that the person experiences along this path are a
\nweakness and strength that is intrinsic to the game of faith. It is like a battle in which you
\noccasionally advance and you occasionally retreat; but all this advancing and retreating
\namounts to the same thing: fighting and overpowering the enemy. You will also find this in
\nexperiential religiosity where mystics have spoken repeatedly and in different terms about
\nthe contractions and expansions they\u2019ve experienced. At times the Beloved was hidden to
\nthe mystic and, at times, the Beloved appeared to them. Sometimes their nights were as
\nbright as days; at other times, their days as dark as nights. But, despite all these trials and
\ntribulations, they remained true to their faith and were people of faith.
\nOf course, if the foundations of faith collapse altogether, faith will become impossible.
\nFaith demands a minimum of conviction and trust. This is generally and conditionally true.
\nFor any faith, some particular rule applies, which must be met and cannot be foregone.
\nI have to repeat that faith is not something that admits of no weakness or strength,
\nthat never trembles or even upends. All these conditions are permissible within faith (by its
\nvery nature), and so much the more so for the actually existing faiths that are like muddy
\nwaters susceptible to a variety of symptoms. God Himself reveals in the Koran the tremors
\nthat some believers undergo: \u00ab In that situation, where the believers tried: they were
\nshaken as by a tremendous shaking. \u00bb (Ahzab, 11) In any great trial or test, there\u2019s always
\nsevere tremors and turbulence. Like autumn winds, this turbulence tears some leaves off
\nthe tree and leaves some behind. This is in the nature of a leaf: it is clinging to the tree by a
\nthin thread. A storm may on occasion uproot the tree itself; what, then, can you expect of a
\npoor leaf?
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n
\nover the past few centuries. That is to say, arguments demonstrating the existence of<\/strong>
\nGod have been subjected to serious attacks, and strong arguments, such as \u00ab the<\/strong>
\nproblem of evil \u00bb, have been reformulated and used to criticise religious beliefs. At<\/strong>
\nthe same time, it has become entirely possible to present mechanical explanations<\/strong>
\ndevoid of the assumption of God. Can these developments be seen as serious events<\/strong>
\nin the history of religious faith? What qualitative and quantitative impact have these<\/strong>
\ndevelopments had on religious faith? And has the \u00ab will to faith \u00bb not been weakened<\/strong>
\nby all this?<\/strong>
\nA. The events you enumerated have principally occurred in the realm of gnostic
\nreligiosity. It was not without reason that people like Ghazzali were so hostile to the field of
\ntheology and that Mowlana believed that \u00ab the leg of the syllogists is of wood \u00bb, that they
\nmade the path to guidance more onerous and that doubt was inherent to philosophical faith.
\nAgain it was not without reason that some people saw the growth of the field of theology as a
\nsign of the weakness of faith. They\u2019d condescendingly tell theologians that when a person
\nturns from experience to theory, it shows that the fire of experience has cooled; that it
\namounts to leaving the orbit of faith and busying oneself with the consequences, effects and
\nsecondary aspects of faith instead.
\nAt any rate, this is nothing new and we have seen it occur in the history of every
\nreligion. And, first, it has to be said that, by its nature, it belongs to the realm of gnostic
\nreligiosity. All the same, as philosophers have always said, disproving the reason doesn\u2019t
\ndisprove the contention. In other words, if you disprove the reasons for the existence of
\nsomething, you cannot conclude that that thing doesn\u2019t exist. Even if we disprove all the
\nreasons for the existence of God, it doesn\u2019t mean that God doesn\u2019t exist. It only means that
\nwe have no reasons for His existence. This is why, both for pragmatic and experiential
\nbelievers, disproving the reasons for the existence of God doesn\u2019t undermine their faith.
\nThey didn\u2019t obtain their faith through reasoning so it isn\u2019t shaken if the reasons are
\ndisproved.
\nHowever, there\u2019s no denying that gnostic religiosity does rest on this basis. When
\nsomeone enters the arena of criticism and opinion, then they\u2019ll be buffeted by strong storms.
\nAnd these storms may at times weaken and undermine their faith and, at times, strengthen
\nit. The situation of the gnostic believer is described in a verse that says: \u00ab The thinker who
\nmoves forward with reasons\/is just as likely to be driven backward by reasons \u00bb. Here we
\nhave a full scale battle scene and, in battle, you can\u2019t afford to go to sleep. Both doubt and
\ncertainty spring forth from evidence and reason. Under the bombardment of reasons, doubt
\nand certainty are, therefore, bound to abate and intensify. In the science of probabilities
\nthere\u2019s a rule that says: all probability is conditional. In other words, an event can become
\nmore or less probable depending on the conditions surrounding it. By the same token,
\nrational certainty is likewise always conditional; as the conditions change, so certainty is
\npulled this way and that.
\nIn view of all this, gnostic believers mustn\u2019t compare their religiosity to the religiosity
\nof pragmatic or experiential believers. They mustn\u2019t imagine that the more thoughtless a
\nperson is, the more pious they\u2019ll be. This is totally false. In fact, this is one point on which
\nGhazzali is open to reproach. When Ghazzali abandoned gnostic religiosity, he began to
\nlong for a return to mundane types of faith. He said somewhere that the concerns and
\ndilemmas that a theologian experiences in the course of their lifetime may flare up when
\nthey\u2019re on their deathbed and they may leave the world faithlessly; whereas an old woman
\nwho has never known such concerns and dilemmas and whose faith hasn\u2019t been tainted with
\ntheology will leave the world piously. This is a surprising judgement coming from Ghazzali.
\nIf a gnostic believer and theologian – who has stepped onto the terrain of qualms and
\ndilemmas – persists along this path with sincerity and strives to discover and understand the
\ntruth, they\u2019ll be a true player in the field of faith.
\nI\u2019ve said a great deal, but one important point remains to be said and that is that
\neverything that befalls a human being is in keeping with human beings. A human being
\ncannot be asked to do something that is beyond their capacities. Faith, doubt, certitude,
\nstruggle… all these are human affairs and we cannot expect them to be other than they are.
\nApart from people who are asleep or frozen, everyone experiences qualms and misgivings
\nand highs and lows. The ocean of everyone\u2019s existence undergoes fierce storms and
\nturbulence. Human beings are not like mountains; they are like oceans. Hence their faith is
\nocean-like and turbulent too. What would be strange is if they were always placid. \u00ab If
\ninnocent Adam succumbed to sin\/who are we to claim to be sin free?\u00bb
\nIf Adam suffered from temptations and dilemmas, how can we ordinary human beings
\nbe expected not to be sucked into the whirlwind of temptation? Mundane, pragmatic
\nreligiosity seems to be the only exception to this rule; but experiential and gnostic religiosity
\nare both equally subject to it. We must correct our image of human beings and see placid
\nfaith as a weak, diluted and deficient form of the phenomenon, not as a model of true faith.
\nAccording to religious legends, human beings\u2019 fall from grace and their life on earth
\nfollowed from two original sins: one was Satan\u2019s sin in not prostrating himself before Adam
\nand, the other, Adam\u2019s sin in eating the forbidden fruit, which itself resulted from a frailty of
\nfaith: \u00ab We had already beforehand, taken the covenant of Adam, but he forgot: and We
\nfound on his part no firm resolve. \u00bb (Taha, 115)
\nHence, people who want to return human beings to a blissful paradise and a placid
\nswamp must turn back the clock, go as far back as Adam and dissuade him from the original
\nsin!
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n
\nbelievers. But the examination of the history of rational debate on religion raises<\/strong>
\nanother question. It would seem that, over the course of history, the arguments<\/strong>
\npointing to the veracity of religious beliefs and experiences have been gradually<\/strong>
\nundermined. At the same time, non-religious explanations have been presented as<\/strong>
\nrivals and replacements for analyses based on faith and religious experiences.<\/strong>
\nWhat\u2019s your assessment of this historical trend?<\/strong>
\nA. Yes, it is as you say. New philosophies are, more often than not, non-religious
\nphilosophies. They\u2019re basically not intended for or geared to proving religious claims; unlike
\nolder philosophies and, especially, what is described as Islamic philosophy – which was like a
\nsteed that Muslim theologians could mount to gallop towards the land of faith. In the past,
\nthe religious climate of societies made it impossible to draw non-religious or irreligious
\nconclusions from philosophy. But in modern secular and liberal societies, some
\nphilosophical teachings are completely at odds with past religious teachings. It\u2019s on this
\nbasis that I think gnostic religiosity in today\u2019s society has become sturdier, as well as more
\ndifficult and more valuable, than the gnostic religiosity of the past.
\nI\u2019d suggested in one of my writings that, in the modern world, we must follow the path
\nof the prophets. In other words, we need to bring religious experiences back to life to open
\nthe way for religious discoveries, in order to allow the construction of a new theology on
\nthese foundations and make it possible to create a garment, woven of the language of the
\nage we live in, by way of a covering for those naked experiences. If the passion of religious
\nexperiences subsides, no theory in the world would really have the strength to revive and
\nrekindle religious faith. Mowlana use to say: \u00ab Sometimes a locksmith makes locks and
\nsometimes he makes keys \u00bb. Today, lock making seems to be all the rage. The possibility
\nof religious experience has, therefore, declined drastically. Of course, the difficulty of
\nreligious experience has made one thing more clear: the chance of any claims to
\nprophethood seems remote and implausible in the modern world; hence, it can be said with
\ngreater certainty that the Prophet of Islam was the seal of all prophets. That is to say, the
\nhistorical climate is no longer such as to breed prophets. As I said in the article \u00ab The
\nSeal \u00bb, the world has been so demystified that it is well nigh impossible now to encounter the
\nrich experiences known to prophets.
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n
\nnot led to a crisis of faith in the modern world?<\/strong>
\nA. It may be possible to say that all three types of religiosity are tending to become
\nsturdier and stronger. Pragmatic religiosity is continuing to play its role in reassuring
\nbelievers and it has an elaborate clerical machinery. Gnostic religiosity has become much
\nsturdier, in view of the books that have been written and are being written on the subject and
\nin view of the extensive and comprehensive debates and critiques that are taking place in
\nthis field. As for experiential religiosity, it has gained a larger circle of yearning supplicants
\nsince the other two types of religiosity are not entirely reassuring and fulfilling. Today there
\nare many non-religious people who long for a shred of the religious faith possessed by
\nbelievers. This longing will do its trick one day. At any rate, one thing is certain: in the
\nmodern, demystified world, the God discovered by believers and the theories woven around
\nHim may well be different from those of the past.
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n
\ndirection: pragmatic religiosity is basically the religiosity of people who, strictly<\/strong>
\nspeaking, have never had religious experiences and who do not have faith in the true<\/strong>
\nsense of the word; gnostic religiosity, for its part, is faced with profound crises and<\/strong>
\nserious problems; and experiential religiosity is suffering from a dearth of deep<\/strong>
\nreligious experiences. Things seem to be worse than you suggest.<\/strong>
\nA. Pragmatic religiosity is basically an everyday type of religiosity. It has served
\nparticular functions in society and is set to survive as a phenomenon that bolsters solidarity
\nand assists people in quelling internal and external dilemmas. This is a type of religiosity
\nthat has existed and will continue to exist. But, although gnostic religiosity is facing crises,
\nthe truth of the matter is that this type of religiosity essentially thrives on crises. You could
\ndescribe it as a creature that feeds on doubt. It therefore grows sturdier, not slimmer, with
\ndoubts and crises. It\u2019s like the legendary animal known as the zamel: \u00ab There\u2019s an animal
\ncalled the zamel\/the more you beat it, the more it works and is content\/beat it with a stick to
\nmake it happy\/make sure you beat it if you want it to become corpulent \u00bb.
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n
\ndescribed it, has to do with religious experience and the subsequent piety.<\/strong>
\nOtherwise, does the mere process of grappling with questions and doubts have any<\/strong>
\nvalue in terms of faith?<\/strong>
\nA. Yes, gnostic religiosity is nourished by criticism and questions. Nonetheless, the
\nconcerns of the gnostic are the concerns of the pious; these are not detached and
\ndispassionate mental processes. In other words, it\u2019s not as if they approach religious
\nquestions in the way a mathematician approaches numerical questions. Quite the reverse.
\nThey enter this field on the basis of commitment to theology and piety. It also has to be
\nsaid that gnostic religiosity should be seen as a collective affair in which there are both
\nwhile another part is enjoying strength. A new discovery or theory, or the resolution of a
\ndoubt may intensify some people\u2019s faith, just as the emergence of a new doubt may diminish
\nsome people\u2019s faith. The history of theology is replete with such victories and defeats.
\nAnyone who looks at these endeavours as a whole may decide that, in this battle, the
\ndefeats have outnumbered the victories; or they may conclude that there have been more
\nvictories than defeats. The tenor of your remarks suggests that, on the whole, you believe
\nthere have been more defeats than victories. Ghazzali\u2019s position seems to be much the
\nsame.
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n
\nA. In truth, I have no reason to believe that the defeats have outnumbered the
\nvictories or to draw the conclusion, on this basis, that this process has caused more harm
\nthan good. And none of the distinguished people who have spoken about this subject have
\npresented any reason that would corroborate such a position. The important point is that,
\ntoday, gnostic religiosity has become a need, and not just as medicine (as Ghazzali put it),
\nbut as food.
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n
\nreligious community to understand and refine their religious experiences, and if we<\/strong>
\naccept that this refined understanding paves the way for subsequent religious<\/strong>
\nexperiences, can we conclude that these developments have led to a refinement of<\/strong>
\nreligious beliefs and, consequently, religious life and faith as a whole?<\/strong>
\nA. Yes, just so. That is to say, if we assume the necessity of a clear mind, free of
\ncontradictions and open to correct information, for the interpretation of experiences, we can
\nsay that the refinement of religious beliefs will help improve and further rectify the
\ninterpretation of religious experiences. This, too, may be one of the blessings of theology
\nand gnostic religiosity. It is the story of Moses and the shepherd all over again. Shepherds
\nhave experiences and people like Moses concern themselves with the interpretation of
\nexperiences. Those whose souls are afire need those who are steeped in knowledge;
\ntheologians and religious scholars can fill the knowledge vacuum.
\nReligion has suffered far more from dogmatism, opportunism and greed than from
\nthe doubts raised by gnosticism. Hence, if we are to build a barrier against something, it
\nshould not be against the spread of gnosticism but against demagoguery and opportunism
\nperpetuated in the name of religion. Whatever else we might say about theologians, we
\nhave to admit that they keep alight the flame of thought and religion-mindedness, and our
\nwhole discussion here about faith, hope and certitude falls within the framework of gnostic
\nreligiosity. We must therefore applaud theologians and value their efforts. We must
\ncelebrate their victories and not be alarmed by or resentful of their defeats; for their defeats
\ntoday can pave the way for their victories tomorrow. Let\u2019s not forget that all their debates are
\nabout the preservation of faith and are replete with faith. A historian once said about
\nDarwin\u2019s theory that Darwin had delivered a blow to the study of God that no apostate had
\never been able to do. Apostates kept alive the debate about the existence or non-existence
\nof God, but, with his theory, Darwin rendered the whole debate unnecessary and pointless.
\nOnce this occurs, we\u2019ve stepped into the arena of irreligiosity; but as long as there are
\ndiscussions about the existence of God, religious experience, the truth of faith, Satan, the
\nexistence of the other world and so on, we should be glad, because it keeps the flame of
\nreligion alight.
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n
\nexperiential religiosity? Are the current circumstances conducive to strengthening<\/strong>
\nexperiential religiosity?<\/strong>
\nA. I think prophets are the heroes of this field, so we must reap maximum benefit
\nfrom their experiences. They have been the teachers on this subject. The fact that it is
\nstated in the Koran that this book is guidance for the pious indicates that piety is the first
\nrequirement for being guided towards God, communicating with Him, getting closer to Him
\nand, ultimately, discovering Him and having a religious experience. The mystics, too, have
\nfollowed in the footsteps of the prophets and taught us lessons in this respect. All these
\nteachings have been oriented towards the attainment of a kind of purity, leanness and
\ndetachment from worldly concerns; the more a person\u2019s attachment to the passing
\nphenomena and appearances of life diminishes – such that the material aspects of the world
\nbecome like sea foam, as Mowlana put it – the more they can come to be in touch with the
\nthings beyond this world. This is why you\u2019ll find that all prophets sought solitude, ate little,
\nspoke little and slept little. And mystics have, therefore, followed the same model. The
\nmodern world is a raucous world and it produces many distractions. This makes it more
\ndifficult to achieve detachment and, consequently, to have religious experiences. But the
\npath remains more or less the same.
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n
\nin the framework of the old world and in the light of the beliefs and ethics of the time?<\/strong>
\nAnd that the modern world demands new methods? In other words, don\u2019t you think<\/strong>
\nthere should be recommendations in keeping with the circumstances of human<\/strong>
\nbeings today?<\/strong>
\nA. I think that those old methods are even more essential and vital for today\u2019s human
\nbeings. Of course, it was easier to carry out those recommendations in the past. It is more
\ndifficult today. To be honest, I don\u2019t think there\u2019s any shortcut and I believe that going
\nthrough the preliminaries that the prophet\u2019s learnt are absolutely essential and vital for the
\nattainment of religious experiences and spiritual discoveries. In other words, they are no
\nless important today and no substitute has been found for them.
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n
\nthat is to say, it contains something known as articles of faith. My question<\/strong>
\nis, what is the position of people like Ghazzali on these aspects of religion? Do they<\/strong>
\nhold that thought should be suspended altogether? Or, if there\u2019s a need for some<\/strong>
\npeople to think and to bring about some adaptations or adjustments in these<\/strong>
\nknowledge-bound aspects, what would the opposition of people like Ghazzali to this<\/strong>
\nkind of analytical or critical activity amount to?<\/strong>
\nA. Ghazzali wanted to see an end to the study of theology. He believed that
\ntheology is, at most, like medicine, not like food, and that it should, therefore, only be used in
\ncircumstances where there\u2019s illness. Hence, he thought theologians were like doctors
\nalthough, unlike doctors, they were not allowed to dispense their wisdom to the general
\npublic. Ghazzali saw theologians as parasites. He said that, since there are bandits on the
\nroad of religion, there\u2019s a need for theologians to fight off the bandits. If banditry is done
\naway with, theologians will be done away with as well. He wrote two relatively nonvoluminous
\nbooks: one was Message from Jerusalem [Al-Risalah al-Qudsiyah] and the
\nother Rules of Beliefs [Qava\u2019id al-Aqa\u2019id] which he fitted into the Revival of the Religious
\nSciences. He said, if anyone wishes to become familiar with this material in brief, they
\nshould read the Al-Risalah al-Qudsiyah and, if they wish to become familiar with it at length,
\nthey should read the Qava\u2019id al-Aqa\u2019id; and, if their questions and concerns remain
\nunresolved after reading these books, they should know that the illness has become deepseated
\nin them and they should just sit and wait for God\u2019s mercy. Ghazzali held this view
\nuntil the end of his life and offered this free advice to people. But looking at things from the
\noutside, it is clear that Ghazzali himself helped make the field of theology more robust. He
\nwanted to be the last of the theologians, but theology did not oblige. In fact, the source of
\nGhazzali\u2019s regret and sorrow lay elsewhere. He was a revivalist and he could see very
\nclearly that three categories of people, preachers, theologians and jurists [fuqaha], had
\ncaptured the minds of most believers and the field of religiosity as a whole, and that
\neverything they did was directed towards promoting their own trades and nothing that they
\ndid was directed towards guiding people to salvation. He therefore made it his duty to give
\nlessons on ethics, in other words, exactly what was needed to achieve other-worldly
\nredemption. And it was in the arena of ethics and internal piety that he managed to
\nembarrass jurisprudence [fiqh] and theology. In fact, what he was seeking was balance.
\nAnd if a balance had been struck between religious teachings externally and internally, as a
\ntrade and as contemplation, as ethics and as theology, he would undoubtedly have been
\nsatisfied. He had found theologians and the fuqaha so unethical and unprincipled that he
\ncame to value mundane faith more highly that theological faith (absence of faith). And he
\nbelieved that the scripture and the Sunna were enough and that there was no need to go
\nfurther than what had been said at the dawn of Islam.
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n
\ndrawn over a faceless entity. My question is this: can we see scripture itself, which is<\/strong>
\nthe outcome of prophetic experience, as a face over that faceless entity or a garment<\/strong>
\nsewn over that core? If so, should we abide by the face or the faceless entity?<\/strong>
\nA. Scripture, especially in Islam, consists of two parts. One part is comprised of
\nmythical faces drawn over the truth. The other part is concerned with life, transactions and
\nlaws, where God plays the role of the commander of that which must be done and that which
\nmust not be done; or, rather, the commander and the legislator is the prophet, and God has
\naffirmed his legislation. At any rate, the elements that relate to commands and
\njurisprudential and legal regulations are not at all of the nature of faces over a faceless
\nentity, and their position is clear. As to the first part, that is, the elements relating to God,
\nresurrection, Satan, creation and so on, these are all of the nature of mythical faces over
\nfaceless experience. And different religions are like different faces over that faceless entity.
\nOne belongs to the Prophet of Islam, another to Jesus Christ and… all the faces stand in the
\nsame relation to that faceless, absolute essence. If we were to use a simile, we could say
\nthat these faces and that faceless entity stand in the same relationship as languages to a
\nthought. Thought is that faceless entity and languages are the external faces thrown over
\nthat thought. All languages stand in the same relationship to that language-less thought, but
\nthe languages are all different from one another and stand in different relationships to us. A
\nChinese person can understand Chinese better than English and the reverse can be said of
\nan Englishman. And thoughts in a Chinese person\u2019s mind take on a Chinese demeanour
\nand, in an Indian\u2019s mind, an Indian appearance. The thoughts themselves may vary in terms
\nof richness and depth, and this, in turn, is reflected in the languages and their
\nmanifestations. The followers of prophets see their leader\u2019s revelation as self-contained and
\ncomplete and, on this basis, they distinguish between the prophets. And, in order to prove
\nthese distinctions, they point to the physiognomies drawn over that faceless entity.
\nAs to your question of whether one can forego the existing faces or not, it has to be
\nsaid that individuals are rationally entitled to do so and to lend a new face to their faceless
\nexperience. But, first of all, most people don\u2019t have a faceless experience, so the question of
\ngiving it a face doesn\u2019t arise. They must, therefore, rely on the prophets and be grateful to
\nthem. Secondly, people who do have this experience – in other words, mystics – while being
\nentitled to lend a new face to their experience, must bear in mind two points: one, from the
\nsocial perspective, as long as they\u2019re living within a community of pragmatic believers, they
\nmust conform and not speak about their new faces. The prophets and, especially, the
\nProphet of Islam, were saying that they had founded a community and a civilisation based on
\ncertain myths and physiognomies concerning the truth, and they would not allow anyone to
\nwreck these. The other point is that, from a personal perspective, the individual mustn\u2019t
\nforget that these existing faces have a history and a tradition, and it would be best not to cut
\noneself off from all this and to ensure that one\u2019s brook is attached to the sea. In other words,
\none must not be indifferent to the physiognomies of our predecessors and forbears. After
\nall, they were treading this same path and they may well have been much more skilled at it
\nthan we are.
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n
\nscripture has always been the centre of attention. And believers have concentrated all<\/strong>
\ntheir efforts on understanding the text. Now, if we accept that this text is a face<\/strong>
\nstanding in for that faceless experience, can we still maintain our total commitment to<\/strong>
\nthe text? Does veneration of the face (the text) not give way to veneration of the<\/strong>
\nfaceless entity?<\/strong>
\nA. If you take Muslims in general, their identity has been entirely dependent on the
\ntext and their reference point has always been the Koran and the Sunna. As to those
\nexceptional individuals who have had their own direct experience, they were never textbound
\nto begin with. In fact, that\u2019s what was meant by interpreting the text. People who
\ndedicated themselves to interpreting the text were, to all appearances, bound by the text,
\nbut, in fact, they were setting aside the text. This was a matter of degree, of course. Hence,
\nwhen you say, we\u2019ll be less text bound, it is just so. We will brush aside some of the faces
\nthat belong to a specific time, region or culture and, as Mowlavi put it, become less drunk
\nfrom the jug of appearance. This process of breaking through the idols of appearance and
\nmelting away the appearance of idols is a continuous one, for which no end is imaginable.
\nAnd let\u2019s not forget that all of this belongs to the realm of experiential and gnostic religiosity.
\nPragmatic religiosity lives with its mythical faces and doesn\u2019t alter them. Clerics are the
\nguardians of those mythical physiognomies and they see the preservation of the collective,
\nritualistic identity of the community as being dependent on the preservation of that ancient,
\nunchanging face.
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n
\nthe text and the experiences expressed through that text. It would seem that a<\/strong>
\nbeliever can only persist in being committed to a particular \u00ab face \u00bb if they are<\/strong>
\nconvinced that, throughout the course of history, that face has been and will continue<\/strong>
\nto be the best covering for that faceless entity or the best explanation for that<\/strong>
\nexperience. However, in view of the theory you\u2019ve presented in Contraction and<\/strong>
\nExpansion, it would seem that this assumption is not necessarily true. It\u2019s quite likely<\/strong>
\nthat that faceless entity will find better explanations and faces in the future.<\/strong>
\nA. It is exactly as you say, for two reasons: one is based on the arguments I
\npresented in Contraction and Expansion; the other is that it is conceptually difficult to say
\nthat one face is superior to another, because that faceless entity stands in exactly the same
\nrelationship to all faces. It is exactly the same as speaking about the length and width of an
\nincorporeal concept. All widths and lengths are equally appropriate to it or equally
\ninappropriate to it. Hence, all the existing faces are equally explanations, models or
\nmanifestations of that faceless entity. The difference lies in their relationship to us. In
\nMowlavi\u2019s words, an individual may become more drunk drinking from one jug than from
\nanother. This has to do with us, not with that faceless entity. The God who appeared to the
\nProphet of Islam was a beautiful God. The God we know in Islam is the God of the Prophet
\nof Islam. When the Prophet says, \u201cGod is beautiful and He loves beauty; I\u2019ve seen God in
\nHis best image\u201d, he is describing his own experience of God. God never appeared to the
\nProphet of Islam with an ugly face, or, if He did, that great man never told us. But,
\ntheoretically speaking – just as the mystics have said – the ugly things in the world are just as
\nmuch a manifestation of God as the beautiful things; although, as human beings, we tend to
\nbe more drawn towards the beautiful than the ugly: we become more drunk from this jug
\nthan from that. And, of course, the height of a pious devotee\u2019s endeavours is to see that
\nfaceless wonder facelessly:
\nThe greatest wonder of all lies in that facelessness
\nLike a thousand forms bursting out of formlessness
\nPersevere till, without a lens, you can see the light
\nSo that, if the lens shatters, you won\u2019t go blind<\/p>\n