I. Intellectuals in Post-Revolutionary Iran

Iran’s Tortuous Path Toward “Islamic Liberalism”

Ahmad Ashraf\(^1,3\) and Ali Banuazizi\(^2\)

This article provides an overview of the intellectual and sociopolitical roots of Iran’s tortuous path toward “Islamic liberalism” and reform. It analyzes the shift in the ideological orientation of a major faction within the political elite from a radical to a relatively moderate and liberal interpretation of Islam. The authors trace the roots of this ideological shift to a series of political developments since the triumph of the Islamic revolution in 1979, including various failures of the revolutionary regime to fulfill its populist and egalitarian promises; a considerable erosion in the legitimacy of the ruling clerics; the successful (though largely silent) resistance of the youth and women against the culturally restrictive policies of the Islamic Republic; the rise of a distinctly anti-fundamentalist, liberal-reformist interpretation of Islam by a number of Iranian theologians and religious intellectuals; and the precipitous decline in the popularity of revolutionary ideas in the 1990s. In spite of the increasing appeal of liberal-democratic ideas of individual freedom, pluralism, and political tolerance in the new reform movement and the overwhelming endorsement of these ideas in four recent national elections, including two presidential polls, the authors argue that the movement has had but a limited and, for the most part symbolic, influence on Iran’s objective, and still repressive, political conditions.

**KEY WORDS:** Iran; Islamic revolution; Islamic Republic; radical Islam; liberal Islam; Islamic fundamentalism; Shi’ism; intelligentsia; student movements; women’s rights.

Iran’s Islamic Revolution of 1979 came as a surprise to both inside and outside observers, including the country’s intellectuals and the political elite, the great powers and their intelligence services, journalists, scholars,

\(^1\)Centre for Iranian Studies, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027-6821.
\(^2\)Department of Psychology, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, 617-552-4124; e-mail: ali.banuazizi@bc.edu.
\(^3\)Correspondence should be address to: Ahmad Ashraf, Center for Iranian Studies, Columbia University, 450 Riverside Drive #4, New York, NY 10027-6821. E-mail: aa398@columbia.edu; ashraf@princeton.edu.
and above all, the leaders of the revolution itself. The same groups were
to be stunned and baffled once more, nearly two decades after the triumph
of the revolution, when an overwhelming majority of the country’s voters
cast their ballots in the 1997 presidential election in favor of a reformist
candidate who promised a liberal Islamic democracy and an end to many
of the repressive constraints that the new Islamic order had imposed on the
nation’s cultural and political life since the revolution. While the utopian goal
of the Islamic Revolution had been the creation of a “government of God on
earth,” the popular mandate of the new reform movement was, in the words
of its chief champion, President Mohammad Khatami, the establishment
of the rule of law, political toleration, and a civil society—the very ideas
that had been cast aside by the entrenched power elites of both radical
and fundamentalist (osulgara) persuasions in the first two decades of the
revolution.

The new reform movement did not, of course, arise in a political or ide-
ological vacuum. It was, rather, a product of certain developments within the
highly fractious postrevolutionary regime that has ruled the country since
1979: a considerable erosion in the legitimacy of the ruling clerics; the rise of
distinctly anti-fundamentalist, liberal-reformist interpretations of Islam by a
group of younger theologians and religious intellectuals; the successful mo-
bilizational efforts of a group of reformed radicals and moderates within the
regime itself with access to the vast resources of the public sector; the resis-
tance of millions of young men and women against the culturally restrictive
policies of the Islamic regime; and the increasing appeal, throughout much
of the world, of liberal-democratic ideals of individual freedom, pluralism,
and tolerance.

**IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION AND FACTIONALISM**

Perhaps the best point of departure for understanding the origin of the
recent ideological polarization in Iran is to recall that, even in the course of
the revolution itself, there was no monolithic “Islamic Ideology” that united
the many diverse groups that formed the revolutionary alliance. There were
several competing interpretations of Islam as a political ideology, each having
an elective affinity for particular social classes and groups. Two significant
variants were *radical Islam* (Islamic socialism), advocated by Ali Shari’ati
(1933–1977), a French-educated sociologist and orator, and *theocratic Islam*,
expounded by Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini. Both made bold innovations
in the interpretation of Shi’ite doctrines, particularly as they applied to the
relationship between religion and politics. Moreover, both supported the use
of violence to transform society into an Islamic utopia. Shari’ati’s version of
such a utopia was an Islamic state ruled by enlightened thinkers, with no room for the clergy in positions of political leadership. Khomeini’s utopia was an Islamic state ruled by the clergy as vicegerents of the “Hidden Imam.” The agenda for Shari’ati was a social revolution; for Khomeini it was a political revolution, aiming at the establishment of a theocracy (velayat-e faqih, the rule of the supreme jurist), as foreseen in his 1970 seminary lectures on “The Islamic Government.”

The followers of Shari’ati’s ideas came from the ranks of the young intelligentsia, who, in the 1970s, had formed several guerilla organizations, the largest and most active of which was the Islamic-socialist Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization. The fundamentalist supporters of Khomeini included some of the same social elements, as well as a small segment of the clergy, several thousand theology students, and segments of the bazaar (merchants, shopkeepers, etc.). While the fundamentalists were generally suspicious of modern ideas and resistant to modern lifestyles, the Islamic radicals were receptive to many aspects of modernity and willing to collaborate with secular intellectuals and political activists.

In the course of the revolution and in the months immediately after its triumph, it was Khomeini’s charismatic leadership that made the alliance between the groups with widely different visions of Islam possible. He was keenly aware of the significance of such an alliance—even if a temporary one—particularly between the clergy and the radical intelligentsia. To that end, he often exhorted the radical students and intellectuals to join hands with the clergy by promising them an active role in the Islamic revolution. For example, in a critical speech that may be considered as one of his first calls to rebellion against the Pahlavi regime in the spring of 1977, he addressed the intelligentsia in the following words:

They [the intelligentsia] should not push aside the clergy who are backed by the masses . . . and say “We want an Islam without clerics.” It is like saying that we want an Islam without politics. This goes against reason. Islam without clerics is totally impossible. Every mullah is influential in his own quarter, but you do not have such influence . . . If a cleric is not sufficiently versed in political matters . . . give him information . . . so that he can act, and people would follow his lead, and things would get done [emphasis added].

The vast majority of the intelligentsia and various radical elements, both religious and secular, heeded Khomeini’s words, accepted his leadership, and struggled alongside the clergy against the ancien régime until well after its collapse. Subsequently, a large number of religious intellectuals served in the leadership or the rank and file of the new Islamic government.

A third ideological variant was liberal Islam, contending for political power through nonviolent means and seeking to accommodate Islam to the modern world. The modern bourgeoisie, some merchants, the modern
middle class, a small segment of the clergy, and some students and teachers followed this liberal orientation. The organizational network of this variety of Islamic ideology was Mehdi Bazargan’s Iran Liberation Movement. Although he headed the “provisional government” for a nine-month period following the victory of revolution, Bazargan’s liberal Islamic movement was marginalized by the increasingly dominant radical and fundamentalist factions and remained eclipsed until the advent of the reform movement in the mid-1990s.

As in the course of the 1905–1911 Constitutional Revolution nearly a century earlier, the concept of justice was at the center of the ideological debates among the followers of the three Islamic orientations during and after the revolution. The conservatives (fundamentalists) adhered to the traditional notion of Islamic justice, one which, much like the Aristotelian idea of justice, states that “equals should be treated alike, but unequals proportionately to their relevant differences, and all with impartiality.” The radicals, on the other hand, gave a messianic interpretation to the concept, one that promised equal distribution of societal resources to all—including the “unequals.” And finally, those with a liberal orientation to Islam understood the notion of justice in terms of the French revolutionary slogan of egalité, i.e., the equality of all before law.

In addition to the above three political ideologies, there were two apolitical Islamic orientations: the orthodox and traditionalist Islam of the religious scholars (ulama) and the devotional Shi’ism of the rural and urban masses. The first appealed, for the most part, to the traditionalist clergy and their faithful followers who yearned for a past in which the dictates of their faith were carried out strictly, when they enjoyed greater respect and influence in their local communities, and when they paid only religious taxes. The second orientation was the popular Shi’ism of the masses, which was marked by such religious practices as the commemoration of the martyrdom, in the seventh century, of the third Shi’ite Imam (Hosein), an occasion that is observed annually by the faithful, especially in urban communities, with religious processions, self-flagellation, and intensely emotional passion plays. Traditionally, the high-ranking clergy often patronized and watched, but did not participate, in such popular practices. The followers of the latter two apolitical forms of Islam remained deeply skeptical of the politicized Islam of the revolutionaries, and, after the revolution, they often looked disapprovingly at the new Islamic regime for its exploitation of Islam for political gains.

After the triumph of the revolution in February 1979, and the subsequent liquidation of the liberal and secular-leftist groups, two principal ideological camps became dominant in Iranian politics, the “conservatives” (fundamentalists) and the “radicals.” The radicals’ following of Khomeini
was due more to their acceptance of his charismatic authority as the leader of the revolution rather than his incumbency of the office of the Supreme Jurist (Vali-e Faqih) or his theocratic vision of the “Islamic Government.” Thus, they called themselves the “followers of Imam Khomeini’s line” (Daneshjouyan-e Peyrov-e Khatt-e Emam). For his part, Khomeini gave these young Islamic radicals his support and encouragement in their efforts to mobilize the masses, particularly during the difficult years of the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. The conservatives, following the traditional Islamic jurisprudence (feqh-e sonnati), upheld the sanctity of private property and advocated a limited role for the state in the economy. The radicals, basing their position on what they described as progressive and dynamic jurisprudence (feqh-e moteraqqi va pouya), considered the achievement of greater social justice and the improvement of the lot of the impoverished masses (mostazafan) as the fundamental duty of the revolutionary Islamic state. They advocated economic self-sufficiency, limits on agricultural landholding, state controls over major sectors of the economy (banking, heavy industries, foreign trade, etc.), and progressive labor and social-welfare legislation.

The two factions differed, moreover, on foreign policy and cultural issues. The radicals adamantly opposed any rapprochement with the United States and, to a lesser extent, other Western countries, while seeking to expand Iran’s relations with the socialist bloc countries. They advocated active support for Islamic and liberation movements (“export of the revolution”) throughout the world. The conservatives favored a more cautious approach to foreign policy, with the ultimate aim of normalizing Iran’s economic relations with the rest of the world, so long as the West’s political and cultural influence on the country could be curbed. In the cultural realm, the conservatives advocated close adherence to Islamic laws and traditions, including strict codes of dress and public conduct for women, limits on certain forms of entertainment and artistic expression, and the like; the radicals either shunned such cultural issues altogether or adopted a more lenient attitude with respect to them.

The two camps appealed to, or claimed to speak on behalf of, different constituencies in society. The conservatives’ support came from the traditionalist clergy, the bazaar merchants, and certain other segments of the traditional middle class. The radicals’ social base was the younger, more militant clerics, members of the Islamic associations in the universities, and others associated with the large network of “revolutionary organizations” that had come into being in the course of or shortly after the revolution.7 Adopting the lexicon of the secular left, the radicals viewed themselves as advocates of the poor, the industrial workers, and the peasantry.8

In the years immediately following the revolution, several circumstances contributed to an atmosphere of terror, a resort to brutal repression, violent
confrontations with the armed opponents to the regime, and, more generally, a move toward radicalization of politics in the Islamic Republic. These included the take-over of the American Embassy in November of 1979 and the ensuing hostage crisis, which led to the collapse of the liberal provisional government of Prime Minister Bazargan, and helped mobilize the radical forces of the secular and Islamic left in a new anti-imperialist front against the United States and the West in general; Iraq’s invasion of the Iranian territory in September of 1980 and the onset of the Iran-Iraq war, which required a massive mobilization of nearly every segment of the Iranian society for support of the war effort; the fall of Bani Sadr, the first president of the Republic, who, due to his critical stance toward the clerical establishment received support from radical, urban-guerilla organizations such as the Mojahedin-e Khalq, Fadaiyan-e Khalq, and several Maoist groups, in spring of 1981; and the clerical leaders’ alarm at the ubiquitous presence and increasing influence of the secular left among the youth, particularly in the universities, secondary schools, and, to a lesser extent, in factories and other workplaces. On the other side, the leftist forces—notably, the Islamic-socialist Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization—due in part to their own radical orientation and the government’s determination to disarm all guerilla organizations, and in response to the repressive wave of intimidation and violence used against them by the regime chose a strategy of armed resistance and confrontation. They initiated a violent campaign against the government that involved the assassination of scores of government officials and leaders of the revolution, including several high-ranking clerics; the incumbent president, prime minister, head of the judiciary; Majles deputies; and others. In the many armed confrontations between the members of these groups and the security forces, thousands of their young adherents were brutally killed. Concurrently, the government carried out a massive purge of universities, high schools, and various other academic and cultural organizations, under the banner of a “cultural revolution,” against the same leftist, “un-Islamic,” or independent faculty, students, and other members of the intelligentsia that led to the arrest, imprisonment, and flight into exile of tens of thousands of individuals (including some 8,000 academics or nearly one-half of the total teaching staff of the universities). All political organizations, professional associations, women organizations, labor unions, and several dozen independent (secular) newspapers and journals, which had flourished during the first year of the revolution, were closed down by the revolutionary committees. It is worthy to note that nearly everyone of the groups mentioned here had played an active part in the revolution.

In the mid-1980s, controversies between the conservative and radical factions intensified around several key issues. One highly charged political
issue was the passage of a relatively progressive labor law by the Parliament (Majles), which was dominated by the radicals, and the subsequent vetoing of this legislation by the Guardian Council. The latter is a twelve-person body, dominated by conservatives since its establishment, which possesses a constitutionally-granted veto power over all laws passed by the Majles that it considers to be inconsistent with Islamic principles. In the case of the newly ratified labor law, the Council’s rejection was on the grounds that it violated Islam’s protection of a free market in which commodities and labor (and, for that matter, slaves) can be freely traded. Other, equally contentious issues, involved the role of the Islamic state in enforcing the norms governing the appearance and behavior of women in public and in movies, women’s employment opportunities and access to certain fields in higher education that had been limited traditionally to men; the wearing of neckties and short-sleeve shirts in sports fields by men; performance of music; playing of chess, etc. While the conservatives took a rigid stance on these cultural issues, the radicals’ position was more flexible and permissive.

At the height of these ideological clashes between the main two factions, Khomeini intervened in favor of the radical camp, expressing his binding opinions in several widely publicized speeches. Furthermore, to limit the influence of the conservative Guardian Council (a clerically-dominated body that reviews laws passed by the Majles and vets candidates for elections), he issued, in 1987, a historic edict which established a “Discretionary Council,” charged with the responsibility of resolving potential conflicts between the Majles and the Guardian Council. He appointed his long-time protégé, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (the then-powerful speaker of the Majles) to head the new Council. Through such constitutional maneuvers and with Khomeini’s overt support, the radical camp effectively seized control of the executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches of the government, the powerful “revolutionary organizations,” the intelligence and security forces, and the broadcast and print media. This left the conservative (fundamentalist) camp, including the then President, Ali Khamenei, with greatly diminished influence in the regime.

The mood of gloom that had descended on the country as a result of the decade-long revolutionary extremism and the eight-year war with Iraq—perhaps the bloodiest regional conflict since the Second World War—was evident on the tenth anniversary of the Islamic revolution on 11 February 1989. Of the numerous major religious and political figures in the country who expressed their hopes, concerns, and anxieties on this important occasion, none was more candid than the Grand Ayatollah Hosein-Ali Montazeri—the then officially-designated heir to Khomeini, who had fallen out of favor with him and no longer enjoyed that designation—in his assessment of the revolution in its first decade:
Have we succeeded in keeping up the revolution in accomplishing its goal and in fulfilling the promises we have given the people? Let’s see what happened to all the unity, coordination and devotion that we enjoyed at the beginning of the revolution…. Let’s see whether we did a good job during the war or rather the enemies who imposed the war on us emerged victorious…. Let’s count how many people did we lose, how many splendid young men were martyred, how many towns were destroyed…. and then repent after realizing that we made these mistakes…. To admit a sin is remorse and it is incumbent upon us to notify each other of our mistakes…. Let’s see what slogans we gave [over the past ten years] that made us so isolated in the world and turned the people pessimistic towards us…. On many occasions, we shouted obscenities, shouted slogans and frightened the world…. The people of the world thought our only task here in Iran was to kill…. To fill the prisons would not heal any wounds…. Prisons must be emptied…. When my statements as a humble student of theology and a sympathizer to the revolution are censored let alone others whose voices can be more easily suppressed…. A free press is essential for a more humane Iran…. The authorities should pave the way for the return of nearly four million Iranians abroad who intend to return to Iran but are scared…. If we care for Islam, the revolution, and the country and want the ideals of the revolution to be safeguarded, we must create unity, optimism, and confidence among the people, just like the beginning of the revolution…. All forces must be mobilized for reconstruction…. We must work to create an open society in the real sense of the word.13

THE POST-KHOMEINI ERA

The end of the Iran–Iraq War in 1988, the death of Ayatollah Khomeini a year later in June of 1989, and, in very short order in the same year, the election of the powerful speaker of the Majles, Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, to presidency set the stage for the emergence of a new, centrist, and more moderate faction in the Islamic Republic. Under Rafsanjani’s leadership, the new faction represented the increasingly pragmatic concerns of the new middle classes, professionals, and members of the bureaucracy in their desire to rebuild the country and its economy after a decade of revolutionary turmoil and a devastating eight-year war. The “pragmatists,” as they came to be known, initiated a series of economic reforms aimed at reducing state control over the economy, encouraging greater private investment and initiative through privatization of certain industries, reforming currency-exchange rates, introducing a five-year economic plan, and the like. In the foreign policy arena, they sought a normalization of Iran’s relations with other countries, particularly those in the region, by playing down the once-popular adventurist fantasy of exporting the Islamic revolution to other Muslim lands. Closer to home politically, in an attempt to break the radicals’ hold on the Majles, Rafsanjani and his aides devised a transparently partisan strategy in the run-up to the 1992 parliamentary elections, which, with the aid of the conservative Guardian Council, “disqualified” and subsequently removed a number of well-known radical candidates from the officially approved election rosters.
Iran’s “Islamic Liberalism” on the ground that their “actual commitment to Islam” (ta’ahhod-e amali beh Eslam) was questionable. This strategy, which had the tacit approval of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei, effectively wrested the control of the new Majles (1992–1996) from the radicals and gave the conservatives a commanding majority. The conservatives, furthermore, forced out many of the radicals from the judiciary, the revolutionary organizations, the intelligence services, the media, etc.

The newly-elected Majles, however, was no more willing to rally behind President Rafsanjani’s reform programs than the previous, radical-dominated one. It successfully blocked some of his choices for the cabinet and discredited others among his aides. Later, following his lackluster election victory to a second term in June of 1993, the conservatives continued to torpedo many of his reform initiatives. In short, Rafsanjani’s strategy of reducing the radicals’ influence in the Majles and elsewhere produced the opposite effect of depriving him of a significant shield against potentially more powerful forces of the right. The outcome was a shift in the balance of power from the Islamic left to the conservative hardliners.

Once again, the new politics of factionalism, this time pitting a more moderate faction against the so-called hardliners, was reflected in the country’s foreign relations. Two somewhat independent tracks, each with a different set of goals and diplomatic orientations, could be identified. The first track, favored by the hardliners, consisted of continued support for the fundamentalist Islamic groups such as the Hezbollah in Lebanon, a “rejectionist” stand on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, relentless railings against the United States as the chief perpetrator of all evil in the world, and, on occasion, assassination of prominent opponents of the regime abroad.

The second track, representing the more realistic perspective of the new moderate factions, emphasized Iran’s need to re-connect with the international community, particularly in view of its critical need for foreign credit and investment, and to pursue its national interests beyond ideological and religious differences. A substantial improvement in Iran’s relations with such conservative regimes as Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states, Egypt, the newly independent Muslim republics in Central Asia, and other Asian countries, as well as active participation in various international organizations, are all example of the more moderate second foreign policy track.

When it came to relations with the West, the differences between the moderates and the conservative hardliners were somewhat more complex. The former, while not rejecting economic ties to the West, remained steadfastly opposed to any attempt to normalize political and cultural relations with Western countries (and in particular the United States), based on the fear that such an opening could increase the influence of Westernized
technocrats and experts in various spheres of national life. They devised the slogan of the “cultural onslaught of the West” to characterize this threat to the revolution, and used it as an ideological justification for attacking writers, journalists, intellectuals, women, artists and others as perpetrators of culturally corrupt and politically subversive Western ideas and tendencies.

At a deeper level, the Islamic Republic could never re-establish the legitimacy that it once enjoyed as the inheritor of a popular revolution under the leadership of its first charismatic leader, Ayatollah Khomeini. From the beginning, there was a fundamental contradiction in the constitution of the Republic between a modern, republican conception of government, on the one hand, and the theocratic conception of a state that grants supreme powers to a ruling jurist, who, in principle, is above all secular laws and the will of the people. This historically unprecedented provision was written into the 1980 constitution, in recognition of Khomeini’s extraordinary status as the highest religious authority in Shi’ite Islam (“source of emulation”), as the charismatic leader of the revolution, and as the founder of the Islamic Republic.15 By the time of Khomeini’s death a decade later in 1989, it had become clear to the ruling clerical elite that no possible successor could be found that could combine the extraordinary religious qualifications of a source of emulation with the ability to lead the country politically. Hence, in the final months of Khomeini’s life and with his consent, an amendment to the constitution, separating the two positions of the “source of emulation” and the supreme jurist or “Leader” (Rahbar), was drafted and later ratified.

When, following Khomeini’s death and a hastily arranged election by the Assembly of Experts, Khameni was chosen as the new Supreme Leader, a number of high-ranking members of the clergy as well as many radicals were less than pleased with the choice.16

Beyond such constitutional issues and their political ramifications, there are other, more palpable reasons for the erosion of the regime’s legitimacy in the eyes of the people. With the political clergy’s direct involvement in the day-to-day affairs of the state, it was inevitable that, when things did not go right, they would be blamed for all the ills of society and failings of the government. Along with these routine recriminations, the Islamic clerics’ once considerable moral authority as pious “men of sacred knowledge” (ulama) has been severely undermined by their abuses of power (accompanied by other high government officials), mismanagement of the economy, suffocating controls over the cultural life of the country, and, perhaps above all, involvement in massive corruption schemes (again in association with state officials and other powerholders). However, it is important to note that many high-ranking members of the clergy have maintained some distance from, and indeed have been openly critical of, the Islamic regime. Such criticisms from within the highest ranks of the clergy have further
undermined the religious basis of the Islamic government as having been “divinely-ordained.”

NONVIOLENT SOCIETAL RESISTANCE

Especially after the turbulent decade of the 1980s, some of the most effective forms of resistance to the Islamic regime have been nonviolent or even “silent,” coming primarily from the youth and women. Even after two decades of indoctrination and propaganda and much to the consternation of the leaders of the Islamic Republic, the current generation of Iranian youth—which may be described aptly as the “children of the revolution”—has shown little commitment to the regime’s Islamization project. Young people (and university students in particular) had served as one of the main pillars of the 1979 Revolution. In the late 1990s, they re-emerged onto the center-stage of Iranian politics—this time energized by the prospects of a democratic change in the country and led by dissident religious intellectuals and reformists. They reactivated the old networks and resources of such organizations as the Office for the Consolidation of Unity (Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat) and used these to organize protest marches, boycotts, and other forms of oppositional activities.

Moreover, young people’s sense of alienation and their opposition to the conservative establishment are closely linked to the economic pressures, social anxieties, and psychological frustrations that they face as an inherently idealistic and change-oriented group. Employment prospects for the huge waves of secondary-school graduates that enter the job market each year are generally quite poor, leading to rates of unemployment and underemployment for the 15- to 24-year-olds that are at least twice the national average for all age groups. For those who want to continue their studies beyond a high-school degree, the prospects are no less bleak, with less than one-tenth of over one-and-a-half million students who take part in the highly competitive examinations to the universities being accepted into the higher educational system. In the meantime, the restrictive social regulations and codes of behavior that are imposed on them—at a time when they are increasingly exposed to the ubiquitous and luring messages of the world broadcast media and the internet—contribute to their further discontent and restiveness.

Next to the youth, Iranian women have struggled continuously to achieve equality with men in all spheres of public life since the very establishment of the Islamic Republic. Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to say that no other arena in the state-society relationship and in the fashioning of the new Islamic order has been as contentious as the social status of women and the rules governing their appearance and conduct in public.
By the same token, no other group has been as resourceful in challenging the various obstacles that have been placed in its way as have women in the course of the past two decades of struggle. In spite of numerous repressive and discriminatory policies—in the workplace, in schools and universities, in sports and recreation, in courts of law, etc.—Iranian women have maintained a significant presence in public life. Furthermore, an unprecedented flourishing of literature by and about women since the revolution has turned women’s issues into a dominant national discourse. In asserting their fundamental rights as citizens and in defying discriminatory legislation, religious edicts, court rulings, and arbitrary decisions by state officials, Iranian feminists have placed emphasis on Islam’s egalitarian ideals rather than attacking its patriarchal values. In these struggles, they have often received significant support from reformist and radical elements within the regime who have access to vast political resources, as well as prominent journalists, intellectuals, lawyers, theologians, lawyers, and others both in Iran and abroad.

While they have had to face economic hardships, official censorship, and political intimidation, the intelligentsia of both religious and secular orientations (including journalists, teachers, some members of the clergy, writers, poets, artists, film-makers, and university students) have shown great resilience and have managed to sustain and promote Iran’s remarkably vibrant intellectual and artistic life. Thus, despite the enormous political and financial obstacles, there was—until the clampdown that began in the summer of 1999—a dramatic increase in the number, quality, and editorial independence of newspapers, magazines, journals, and books. Indeed, as Morad Saghafi, the editor of *Gof-o-Gu* [Dialogue], a leading quarterly with a wide readership among secular intellectuals, has suggested recently, the various government-imposed restrictions on intellectual life may have actually pushed intellectuals further into the public domain and enhanced their status in the eyes of their audiences. Borrowing Russell Jacoby’s concept of “public intellectuals,” Saghafi concludes:

By chasing intellectuals out of universities, by preventing them from participating in important events and the debates they generated, and finally by avoiding them for more than a decade, the Islamic Republic pushed Iranian intellectuals into becoming public intellectuals. Thus, the more the public turned against the State, the more it looked toward intellectuals, who in the absence of political organizations, seemed to be the only group capable of having a socio-political discourse. Every loss of legitimacy for the State benefited the only social group that, despite all difficulties, seems to have crossed the desert [a reference to the first two bleak decades of intellectual life in postrevolutionary Iran]. What is unknown at this stage is whether they will be able to handle this new challenge.

The most common form of resistance to the regime has come from largely apolitical masses that are often resentful of the government’s interventions in matters of religion, making a distinction between “official
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religion” (din-e dowlati) and “our own religion” (din-e khodemoun). Their rejection of the government-imposed forms of religiosity affirms the traditional Shi’ite suspicion of temporal authority—in this case, an Islamic state—and a belief in the desirability of maintaining one’s religious independence from the state. Their resistance is reflected, not so much in open forms of opposition to the government, but rather in expressions of political apathy and cynicism and in the refusal to participate in regime-sponsored activities (Friday prayers, anniversary celebrations, official visits, etc.).

LIBERALIZING TRENDS AND THE 1997 REFORM MOVEMENT

A drastic shift from the radical utopianism of the revolution toward Islamic and secular liberal ideas took place in the early 1990s. For the most part, this was a reflection of a change in the collective consciousness of the radical religious intellectuals, many of whom increasingly adopted the language and theoretical orientation of the Western social science in their analyses of Iranian society and politics. This was a far cry from the strong antipathy that most Iranian intellectuals, both religious and secular-leftist, had developed toward the Western liberal tradition during the 1960s and 1970s, and in the years immediately after the revolution. Two dominant figures in the ideological pantheon of Iran’s religious intellectuals before the revolution were Jalal Al-e Ahmad (1923–1969) and Ali Shari’ati. It was Al-e Ahmad, who popularized the notion of “West-struckness” (gharbzadegi), as a form of disease on the psyche and cultural consciousness of Third World peoples, one that makes them devalue their own authentic traditions, to accept uncritically the cultural products of the West, and to perpetuate the existing hegemony of the West and its exploitative hold on their societies. His placing of the blame for these and many other ills of the country on its Westernized intellectuals—particularly those who, as he put it, had “sold their pen” to the regime—created an atmosphere of acerbic anti-intellectualism among the Iranian intelligentsia for well over a generation.

Shari’ati’s influence was different. He claimed to have constructed a new theory of man and society based on the foundations of dialectics, critical social science, and a radical interpretation of Islam. His use of metaphors borrowed from the Qor’an and Shi’ite-Islamic traditions to valorize those who struggle for justice and human dignity through radical, and if necessary violent, action appealed to an increasingly politicized generation of practicing Muslim students, many of whom saw themselves to be involved in a similarly heroic struggle against the Pahlavi regime. His radical Islamic vision was a far more compelling alternative to Marxist or liberal theories of the secular West for tens-of-thousands of university and secondary-school students and
others who listened to his electrifying sermons (or their widely distributed cassettes) or read his clandestinely published pamphlets and books. The radical religious intelligentsia, therefore, found in Shari’ati’s ideas not only a more authentic and powerful revolutionary ideology than those offered by secular theorists, but also a new way of understanding and changing the world that affirmed their own religious weltanschauung, cultural mores, and political values. For them, without exception, Dr. Shari’ati—or, more simply, “the doctor”—was the ideologue and theoretician of the revolution.25

With the increasing disillusionment of religious intellectuals with the authoritarian and repressive character of the postrevolutionary government, paralleling the world-wide spread of democratization movements in the 1990s, there was a distinct shift among many religious and secular intellectuals toward new modes of theological discourse and political analysis. The most eloquent expression of these new approaches may be found in the writings of Abdalkarim Soroush, Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, and Mohsen Kadivar.26 At a different level, a number of formerly radical intellectuals, with a more direct interest in policy-oriented analyses, established the Center for Strategic Studies, affiliated with the Office of the President, to provide an institutional base for the reformist elements in and around the government. Among the individuals who have been affiliated with the Center in leadership positions have been Mohammad Mousavi Kho’einiha, the leader of the students who occupied the premises of the American Embassy in 1979 and a former prosecutor-general of revolutionary tribunals, and Said Hajjarian, a founder of the Ministry of Intelligence and its first deputy-minister and, later, the chief strategist for the 1990s reform movement. The Center has become a major promoter of modern social science theories, the same stock of knowledge that many of its present affiliates would have considered to be “bourgeois” or “American” social science a decade earlier. In the reformist environment of the late 1990s, contemporary Western social science theories, including various brands of post-modernism and critical theory, have been used to debunk fundamentalist conceptions of society and politics, and to promote ideas of modernity and Islamic democracy.27

The 1997 presidential election ushered in a new era in postrevolutionary Iranian politics. Khatami’s campaign platform emphasized the rule of law, building a civil society, a moderate foreign policy, and the protection of civil liberties guaranteed by the Islamic constitution. His election represented the most significant example of popular participation in national politics in recent times—second only to the revolutionary mobilization of the late 1970s. According to most observers, the victory was as much a manifestation of the voters’ rejection of the extremist politics of the left in the 1980s and the right in the 1990s as it was an endorsement of Khatami’s moderate, well-reasoned, and liberal campaign statements. His 1997 electoral victory over his powerful
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conservative rival would not have been possible, furthermore, without the vast human and financial resources that were contributed to his campaign by members of the pragmatist camp of the incumbent president, Rafsanjani, as well as the many formerly radical elements within the regime. Of particular significance to the Khatami campaign were the vast resources of the Municipality of Tehran and its daily newspaper, Hamshahri (with a circulation of over one million). The city’s then powerful mayor, Gholamhosein Karbaschi, a reformed radical, served as Khatami’s campaign manager, and, in that capacity, he played a critical role in mobilizing the support of millions of people for Khatami in Tehran and other major cities.28

During much of Khatami’s first presidential term (1997–2001), his supporters rallied behind the slogans of civil society and the rule of law, but they were besieged by the conservative hardliners, who had gained effective control over key positions within the Islamic state.29 These included positions in the judiciary, the para-legislative Guardian and Discretionary Councils, the armed forces and the militia, the intelligence services and vigilante groups working in tandem with them, the broadcast media, and the para-statal foundations, e.g., the Foundation for the Impoverished (Bonyad-e Mostazafan va Janbazan) and the Martyr Foundation (Bonyad-e Shahid), Imam Reza’s Shrine Foundation (Bonyad-e Qods-e Razavi), and several others. The latter, putatively philanthropic foundations, which are beyond the reach of the fiscal and regulatory agencies of the state, form a massive network of patronage and corruption, and, “an economy within the economy” that effectively controls as much as one-third of the country’s domestic production (GDP).30

Khatami’s election victory in 1997 was followed by two other sweeping wins by reformist candidates in the municipal elections of 1999 and the Majles elections of 2000. In the latter election, the reformists won some 200 of the 290 seats, thus giving the pro-Khatami candidates a decisive majority in the legislative body. Such unmistakably pro-reform popular mandate at the polls, however, did not translate into legislative power and effectiveness for the reformists. The conservatives (fundamentalists), clearly on the defensive against a formidable majority of the people, decided to resort to tactics of intimidation, vigilantism, and terror against their political rivals. They started a systematic crackdown against the press, the intellectuals, and other outspoken critics of the regime.

In July of 1999, Salam, a popular pro-reform newspaper was closed by the order of the Press Court. Following peaceful demonstrations against the closure on the campus of Tehran University, militia forces entered the student dormitories and brutally attacked the students, killing at least four in the assault, and injuring and arresting hundreds. The dormitory assault ignited a series of protest demonstrations over the next several days in Tehran and other cities, which escalated into full-scale riots when the demonstrators were
attacked by vigilante Partisans of the Party of God (Ansar-e Hezbollah). The civil unrest resulting from the student protest was the most serious since the revolution and unprecedented in the participants’ blatant use of anti-regime slogans and the involvement of thousands of non-students as active participants. They were harshly suppressed by the police, the militia, and vigilante groups. Less than a year later, starting in April of 2000, the conservative-dominated judiciary began a campaign of intimidation against the press. More than forty pro-reform newspapers and magazines were forcibly closed because of their alleged “denigration of Islam and the religious elements of the Islamic revolution.” Over the next several months, journalists and editors were the primary targets of the conservatives’ repressive attacks against the print media. Iran’s best-known investigative journalist and the editor of Fath newspaper, Akbar Ganji, was sentenced to ten-years in prison (later reduced to six years) for his writings that implicated several senior officials in the 1998 murders of five intellectuals and political activists. These and other actions to muzzle the press, including the imprisonment of over two dozen well-known journalists, have won Iran the dubious distinction of being called “the largest prison for journalists in the world” by the Paris-based Reporters sans Frontiers.31

Since the late 1990s, religious intellectuals and pro-reform political activists have been targeted by the conservative establishment. For example, in April 2000, several prominent Iranian intellectuals, journalists, publishers, and women’s rights activists traveled to Berlin to attend an international conference on the future of reform in Iran. The conference had been organized by Germany’s Green Party with financial support from several German foundations. Upon their return to Iran and over the next several months, many of the participants were brought to trial before the Revolutionary Court in Tehran on charges of conspiring to overthrow the Islamic Republic. Several of them, including the journalist Akbar Ganji, the women’s rights activists Mehrangiz Kar and Shahla Lahidji, the reformist cleric Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari, and the independent politician Ezzatollah Sahabi, received severe sentences of imprisonment and fines. In March of 2001, the judiciary ordered the closure of the religious-nationalist Iran Freedom Movement (the only tolerated opposition group in the country since the revolution) on charges of attempting to overthrow the Islamic Republic, following the arrest and detention of twenty-one of its leading members.

Khatami’s failure in implementing his promised political reforms and the lack of any significant improvement in Iran’s faltering economy during his first four-year term, did not prevent him from scoring another impressive victory in the June 2001 presidential elections, garnering seventy seven percent (over twenty-one million) of the votes cast. However, in spite of
two clear mandates for change that he has been given by an overwhelming majority of his countrymen, and even though pro-reform candidates are in control of the Majles as well, the embattled president still faces the same constitutional constraints and political obstacles that stymied his first presidential term.

In all, it appears that Iran’s democratic reform movement has had its impact mainly on intellectual debates over the requirements and possibilities for a genuinely liberal, civil, and democratic society. So far, however, the movements impact on the objective, and still repressive, political condition of the country has been quite limited and largely symbolic—and this in spite of the fact that the reformists have received overwhelming popular endorsements in two presidential elections in 1997 and 2001, as well as two other nationwide polls. The prospects for a peaceful and sustained process of democratization in Iran, just as in other nations that have traversed the path from authoritarianism to democracy, depend ultimately on the ability of the reformists to institutionalize their opposition in the form of civil-societal and political organizations and to continue their nonviolent challenges to the entrenched conservative elites. The willingness of the conservative forces to heed the popular mandate for greater political and cultural freedoms, economic reform, respect for law, and, above all, refrain from the use of violence will determine whether a gradualist course of reform will be given a chance.

ENDNOTES


3. Describing Khomeini’s followers as “fundamentalists” requires a brief explanation. Fundamentalism, as it appeared in all major world religions (including Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism) in the closing decades of the twentieth century, displays several core ideological and organizational characteristics. Deeply discontented with the secularizing forces in the modern world, the fundamentalists’ ultimate goal is “to bring God back in” and establish a divinely ordered society. They are suspicious of and disdainful toward such manifestations of modernity as the secular state, the civil society (with its attitude of acceptance of non-orthodox religious practices and tolerance toward other religions), secular worldviews, and apolitical leadership within their own faith. For a concise analysis of fundamentalism as a universal phenomenon, see Gabriel A. Almond, Emmanuel Sivan, and R. Scott Appleby, “Fundamentalism: Genus and Species,” in Martin E. Marty and
The Shi'ite fundamentalist movement in Iran was started by a young charismatic religious student, Navvab Safavi, in the early 1940s, when he founded the clandestine and militant Devotees of Islam (Feda'iyan-e Eslam). His organization had a hostile attitude toward the then secular Iranian state and the highest ranking Shi'ite leader and “source of emulation,” the Grand Ayatollah Sayyed Hosein Boroujerdi, on the grounds of the latter’s apolitical stance. At the time, Ayatollah Khomeini was among a tiny group of high-ranking clerics in Iran who showed sympathy for the Devotees of Islam. Nearly two decades later, in the early 1960s, a number of veterans and sympathizers of this group founded the Coalition of Islamic Groups (Jami’iyah-ye Motalefe-ye Eslami) and accepted the charismatic and increasingly militant Khomeini as their source of emulation and played a key leadership role in the 1963 urban riots, the revolutionary movement of 1977–79, and ultimately formed the core of the “fundamentalist” faction in the new Islamic regime.


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10. The taking of American hostages and the subsequent mobilization of “anti-imperialist forces” by the radical forces within the regime caused a deep split in the secular-leftist organizations, with one side advocating cooperation with the regime on the ground that it is engaged in an anti-imperialist struggle and the other side arguing that the regime is fundamentally reactionary and, as such, should be rejected and denied any cooperation by
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progressive forces. The ensuing internal conflicts weakened these groups and made them vulnerable to the final, crushing strikes by the Islamic regime in the early 1980s. For an analysis of the demise of the secular left in this period, see Maziar Behrooz, *Rebels with a Cause: The Failure of the Left in Iran* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999), pp. 95–134.

11. The fall of Bani-Sadr began with the clashes between the supporters of the regime and Mojahedin and Fada’iyan organizations during a speech by Bani-Sadr on the campus of Tehran University in March, 1981. This incident led to a serious dispute between Bani-Sadr and Ayatollah Khomeini, which led finally to Bani-Sadr’s fall from grace and removal from presidency in June of 1981. For a detailed, official account of the episode, see *Gha’ele-ye Chahardahom-e Esfand-e 1359: Zohour va Soqout-e Zedd-e Enqelab* [The Dissension of the Fourth of March of 1981: The Rise and Fall of Counter-Revolution] (Tehran: Ministry of Justice, 1981[?]).


15. Despite Khomeini’s personal qualifications, the creation of the position of supreme jurist was a matter of considerable controversy within the constituent assembly that was charged to draft a new charter for the Islamic Republic in 1979. It was ultimately pushed through after intense maneuvering by Khomeini’s powerful clerical allies in the assembly and over the strenuous objections of those who were mindful of the authoritarian potentials of such an arrangement. For an insightful analysis of the dynamics of this process, see Asghar Schirazi, *The Constitution of Iran: Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997).


17. The resistance and activism of the poor, the rural migrants, and squatters during a period stretching from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s in the large urban have been chronicled and analyzed in Asef Bayat, *Street Politics: Poor People’s Movement in Iran* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

18. See Mehrdad Mashayekhi’s “The Revival of the Student Movement in Post-Revolutionary Iran” in this issue.

19. Ibid.


21. See Farideh Farihi’s “Religious Intellectuals, the ‘Woman Question’ and the Struggle for the Creation of a Democratic Public Sphere in Iran” in this issue.


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27. For an analysis of the contributions of the reformed radical religious intellectuals, see Ahmad Sadri’s “The Varieties of Religious Reform: Public Intelligentsia in Iran” in this issue.


